Without Thieu *The Editors*

THE NEW REPUBLIC

NEWSPAPER
NR BAD4 W019 OCT 72
BLADWIN WALLACE COLLEGE
RITTER LIB PERIODICALS
BEREA OH10 44017

A Journal of Politics and the Arts—April 19, 1975, 50 cents

RITTER LIBRARY
BALDWIN-WALLACE
COLLEGE

Ford and Crisis—*John Osborne*

On Commitments—*Michael Walzer*

Give 'em Death?—*Michael Roberts*

The New Medicine—*Paul Starr*

Selling Out the Kurds—*Jon Kimche*

Global Reach—*David Fromkin*

About Biography—*Peter Stansky*

Antonioni—*Stanley Kauffmann*

Potsdam—*James Chace*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IBM Reports

The computer and research

The computer serves society in many ways. It is an information organizer, helping deal with large amounts of data. It is a productivity tool, helping us make better use of our resources. It is a management tool, providing perspective on complex decisions.

The computer is also a major research tool, perhaps the most useful of any at the disposal of science today. It is being used to explore many different frontiers of the natural world mathematically—recreating and analyzing interactions that could not otherwise be observed or understood.

It is helping scientists develop a mathematical model of the nucleus of a human cell for use in cancer research. It is helping develop potential new energy sources such as the fusion reactor. It is helping weather researchers learn how to control air pollution.

In these and countless other activities, the computer is performing calculations that were often impractical, or even impossible, only a few short years ago—calculations that have now been made practical by rapid advances in computing speeds and storage capacity, and sharply reduced cost-per-computation.

It's particularly appropriate that the computer should play such an important role in scientific research, for research has played a key role in the computer's own development. A prime example is the remarkable evolution in the basic components of the computer—from the early technology based on large, relatively slow vacuum tubes, to transistors, to integrated circuits, to today's microscopically small high-speed circuitry.

IBM research scientists made critical contributions to these advances. Now they are helping look for the breakthroughs of tomorrow—exploring new techniques ranging from sophisticated lasers to devices much faster than even the most advanced circuitry now in use.

IBM's commitment to research, to finding new ways to do things better and to reducing the cost of doing them, is a continuing one. And it is a cornerstone of our expectation that the technological strides of the next twenty-five years will eclipse even those of the last twenty-five.

We are working toward that goal.

IBM

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TRB®

from Washington
April 19, 1975

Ye Eyes Onlie

Rummaging through a dusty file in the Boston Antiquarian Society the other day we found a brittle brown envelope in a crevice, quaintly labeled, "General Thomas Gage, Province of Maffachufetts Bay, April, 1775."

The enclosure, marked "Ye Eyes Onlie," was from the Colonial Intelligence Agency (CIA) and appeared to be a file on a local troublemaker, Sam'l Adams. Two attached documents gave different evaluations of the first report.

With trembling hands we smoothed out the priceless 200-year-old manuscript, which was stamped "His Majesty's Service—Top Secret—Confidential—To be Shredded." How it escaped destruction we can only surmise.

The first letter in a rough, undisciplined hand revealed that agent XYZ had recently made a covert entry into the office of Sam'l Adams' chirurgeon in hope of gathering defamatory evidence of the former's "cholers and vapors," along with possible evidence of French subsidies. Apparently he was unsuccessful. But XYZ, it appeared, had also effected penetration of the circle that met nightly in Tom Dawes' garret where, the report asserted, "they use tobacco and drink flip" and prepare the events of the morrow's town meeting in a "smoak-filled room." He gained a reputation as a hothead in these conspiracies, XYZ reported, rather demurely, and it greatly went against the grain of his loyal conscience and he hoped it would be considered in reckoning his pay.

The agent's superiors must have been aware of the situation but the extent of Sam'l Adams' operations seems surprising even at this day. He moved by symbols: a simple elm on the Common became a "Liberty Tree" from which hung effigies; "Sons of Liberty" were recruited from boisterous elements who cowed timid Loyalists; the unhappy incident of 1770 where a street crowd pelted British sentries and there was bloodshed, had become a "massacre" commemorated on its anniversary each year although (noted the informer) Sam'l Adams' very cousin, John Adams, lawyer from Braintree and married to Mistress Abigail, though a tainted "leveler" himself, could not accept the "massacre" and defended the accused soldiery in court.

Agent XYZ now disclosed that three articles in the public prints signed respectively "Candidus," "Vindex" and "Policola" were all one man, to wit Sam'l Adams. He had drafted no less than 40 such polemics under 25 names. More important, he had extended his underground to the four principal towns of His Majesty's North American colonies: Philadelphia, 30,000; New York, 25,000; Boston, 18,000; and Charleston, SC, 10,000. The loyalist counteragency, Friends of British Intelligence (FBI), was now infiltrating the Adams operation, Committee of Correspondence.

Agent XYZ finished with two items that must have brought his superiors right up straight in their oak chairs, and the quill splutters at the words: Conspirators have stored military goods in meeting houses of Lexington and Concord, and ring-leaders Sam'l Adams and John Hancock are riding shortly from Boston to Philadelphia to participate in a "continental congress," or some such affair, with other knavish agitators.

What a sensation those disclosures would have created if given to Seymour Hersh of the local *Boston News-Letter!* Attached to the XYZ document is a position paper from his superior, stamped "HM Policy Planning Council." It urges caution. Granted that the forces of the world's greatest power have nothing to fear from the homespun yeomen of this rude land, yet some of the malcontents seem sincere. Would it not be better to yield a little? Will not direct confrontation play into the hands of foxy Sam'l Adams? Furthermore in this cursed frozen land, where the winter lasts six months and the stiff-necked inhabitants, stubborn as the nails of pride and given to quoting the Bible pharisaically down their long noses, have no concept of gentlemanly military strategy or the prescribed rules of war and might turn every stone wall into a barricade.

This writer, like agent XYZ, proceeds to make disclosures, presumably to Gen. Gage. The wile of their adversaries, he admonishes, can hardly be estimated. Only last month, March 6, Boston had its latest town meeting circumventing Gen. Gage's specific order that no new meeting be held without specific permission. The rogues argued that their last meeting, in August, was "adjourned" not "dissolved," so this was merely a continuation.

Thinking to unstabilize the meeting, the letter continues, the Colonial Intelligence Agency brought 300 officers, restive for action, to fill the rear of the meeting house where the fifth commemorative anniversary of Sam'l Adams' cursed "massacre" was called. At the first insult to his Majesty, Col. James by prearrangement would throw an egg, which would be the signal for out swords, to teach these louts a lesson. The young officers had scores to settle in this inhospitable shore where even 'til recently the holiday of Christmas was disdained as a pagan rite.

But see the wile of this serpentine Sam'l Adams! Perceiving the British stratagem he invited the officers to come front, with feigned politeness and malignant softness, and put the abashed soldiers in the wrong by his malevolent courtesy, following which Dr. Joseph Warren made a very modest, quiet address. For his part, concludes the writer, he is pleased at the peaceful outcome for there is progress and light at the end of the tunnel.

The third message is in a firm, military hand boldly written across the top of the foregoing document apparently from Gen. Gage himself. Orders for Maj. John Pitcairn. Prepare a task force from the 11 regiments closing Boston harbor 'til the spilled tea is paid for. These malcontents can be cowed by a show of force, for the majority is loyal. We rely, the message says, on the forgotten man. Only one bad apple will corrupt a firkin. Too many have been seduced, Gen. Gage writes, by these Harvard intellectuals. Boston must be tamed now, lest other areas fall like a row of dominoes. You are directed to apprehend Sam'l Adams and Hancock, dead or alive. Put a watch on roads from Boston, with special vigilance on one Paul Revere, silversmith, suspected courier.

The letter, dated April 17, rather pretentiously dubs the plan Operation Rolling Thunder. On to Lexington and Concord, it orders.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



THE MAGAZINE OF HIGHER LEARNING

Change

VOLUME 6 NUMBER 9 NOVEMBER 1974

ARTICLES 22 **DeFunis and Beyond.** David L. Kirp and Mark G. Yudof
Two legal scholars examine the difficult problem of race-conscious admissions in the wake of the Supreme Court's nondecision in the DeFunis case.

27 **Black Teacher, White Campus.** Patricia Stringer
A white woman teaching at a predominantly black Southern college discovers that her sex presents as many problems as her race.

32 **On Political Maturity.** Robert M. Hutchins
One of higher education's foremost iconoclasts reflects on the nature of an education appropriate to a community of free men.

34 **Transforming the Libraries: From Paper to Microfiche.** Paul Starr
The development of microform, instant retrieval systems, and portable readers may profoundly change the world of libraries and patterns of reading and study.

REPORTS 11 **Naderizing Consumer Education.** Easy Klein
14 **Restricted Admissions in Switzerland.** David Ray Papke
17 **Death of Britain's Teachers Colleges.** Brian MacArthur
19 **Avoiding High School Senior Slump.** Henry Weil

LETTERS 4 On black colleges. Western Kentucky University. education of psychiatrists. theater arts.

VIEWPOINT 6 **Humanizing the Humanities.** Roger Shattuck
EDITORIAL 9 **The Crisis of Philanthropy**
DIALOG 42 **The Debate on Tenure.** John R. Silber. Robert Van Waes. Joseph A. Kershaw
WASHINGTON 46 **Scuttling Education Research.** Judith Miller
RESEARCH 48 **How Deans Evaluate Teachers.** Peter Seldin and Edward Wakin
SCIENCE POLICY 50 **How Deans Evaluate Teachers. Public Access to Grant Applications. AAAS Fights Deficit. NAS on EPA Research.** Daniel S. Greenberg

52 **The Fashion World's Harvard.** Bernard Bard
COMMUNITY COLLEGES 54 **Life Insurance.** Torrey D. Dodson, Jr., and Claire Sheahan Zoupanos
PRACTICALLY SPEAKING 56 **Antibias Regulations of Universities: Faculty Problems and Their Solutions by Richard A. Lester.** Sheila Tobias
REVIEWS 57 **Sex Isn't That Simple: The New Sexuality on Campus by Richard Hettlinger.** Suzanne Gordon
58 **Blowing the Whistle on Intercollegiate Sports by J. Robert Evans and An Inquiry into the Need for and Feasibility of a National Study of Athletics by George H. Hanford.** Richard J. Margolis
59 **The Great School Wars: New York City, 1805-1973. by Diane Ravitch.** Dorothy K. Jossup

Illustrations: Cover pp. 24, 25, 29, 41 Dennis Hermanson; Photos p. 31 courtesy of New York Public Library; pp. 47, 49 courtesy of Eastman Kodak Company

Editor-in-Chief George W. Bonham Senior Editor Colin Morris Managing Editor Margaret B. LeBeouf Associate Editor Ruth Fischer Book Editor Diana M. Art Director Donald B. Clausen Compositor Mary Lucas Assistant Publisher Deanna M. Norman Birnbaum Arthur M. Cohen William H.

Will Change Become a Habit? The Proof is in the Reading.

In the past few years, **Change** has become the leading platform of national debate over the future of higher learning. This is no small social issue, and if you are not already a member of this important group of **Change** readers, we hope that you will become one now.

The reasons for joining may be self-evident: Each month, **Change** brings you a view of the world of education not available anywhere else (as you can see by the sample contents page above). **Change** is written by some of the most perceptive thinkers in the country (and, incidentally, **for** the best minds in the country as well).

Each monthly issue of **Change** brings you exciting and provocative intellectual fare. Its stimulating articles are among the most widely quoted in the country. Its briefer **Change Reports** bring you exclusive, analytical journalism from the four corners of the world (average reading time: 5 to 8 minutes each). The regular columns in **Change** include Academic Research, Science Policy, Washington—guest editorials, some of the best book review essays around and a special section on community colleges. **Change** editorials are widely quoted and debated.

If you would like to test these claims, you can now do so without risking a penny. Here is a special offer: simply mail in the coupon. You will receive next month's copy of **Change**, and we will enter a one-year trial subscription for $12 instead of the usual $14. If **Change** does not live up to your expectations, mark your invoice "cancel." No questions asked. But one small warning: reading **Change** may be dangerous to some of your fondest misconceptions.

CHANGE, NBW Tower
New Rochelle, NY 10801

Please enter my one-year no-risk enrollment to CHANGE at the special introductory rate of $12, saving me $2 over the current price. If I am not completely satisfied, I retain the right to cancel my subscription upon receipt of the first invoice, and will owe nothing.

☐ Bill me for $12
☐ Charge $12 to my credit card as indicated below.
☐ My $12 is enclosed. (If I should cancel, I will receive a full refund.)

Please charge my: P 6040

☐ BankAmericard
☐ American Express
☐ Master Charge

credit card information

_____

Signature: _____

Name _____

Address _____

City _____

State _____ Zip _____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NEW REPUBLIC *A Journal of Politics and the Arts, Vol. 172, No. 16, Issue 3145, April 19, 1975. Note: Issue numbers 3129 (Dec. 28) and 3130 & 3131 (Jan. 4 & 11 combined) have been misnumbered. Published weekly (except the issues of January 4, July 12, August 9, August 23) and distributed by* The New Republic, *1244 19th Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20036. Phone 331-7494. Single copy, 50¢; Yearly subscriptions, $17; foreign, $20; students, $10. Send all remittances and correspondence about subscriptions, undelivered copies and changes of address to Subscription Department,* The New Republic, *381 West Center Street, Marion, Ohio 43302.* *Copyright 1975 by The New Republic, Inc.* *Item g. Second class postage paid at Washington, DC and additional mailing offices. Indexed in Reader's Guide.*

Contents

-8 Comment
Without Thieu, Secret Pledges, Bad Investments, Too Little, Too Late
10 A Note on Commitments—*Michael Walzer*
11 White House Watch: Ford and Crisis—*John Osborne*
13 Our Iberian Presence—*Zalin Grant*
15 The New Medicine—*Paul Starr*
17 Give 'em Death? Is Capital Punishment Back to Stay?—*Michael Roberts*
19 Selling Out the Kurds—*Jon Kimche*
22 Films—*Stanley Kauffmann*
23 Books—Reviews by *David Fromkin, James Chace, Abraham Brumberg, Stanley Karnow*
25 On Biography—*Peter Stansky*
31 Fine Print—*Doris Grumbach*
32 Poem—*Bink Noll*

The Staff

Chairman, Editorial Board—Martin Peretz
Publisher—Robert J. Myers
Managing Editor—David Sanford
Executive Editor—Walter Pincus
Literary Editor—Doris Grumbach
Senior Editor—John Osborne
Foreign Editor—Stanley Karnow
Associate Editor—Eliot Marshall
Assistant to the Editors—Gwen Somers
Assistant to the Literary Editor—Cherryl Holt
Contributing Editors:
Robert Brustein, Robert Coles, Joseph Featherstone, Gerald W. Johnson, Nathan Lewin, Peter J. Ognibene, John Seelye, Melville J. Ulmer, Michael Walzer, Paul R. Wieck
Films and Theater—Stanley Kauffmann
West Coast Editor—Peter Barnes
Production Manager—Mary Henninger
Assistant Production Manager—Ellen Cochran Hicks
Circulation Manager—Elizabeth A. Scanlan
Business Manager—Pearl Wilmer Ramsey
Assistant Business Manager—Constance Cole Twining
New Republic Feature Syndicate—Leslie B. Seagrave
Advertising and Promotion—Ilene Briggin Kahane
Receptionist—Ruby McGowan
Advertising Representative—E. Laurence White
50 E. 42nd St., NYC 10017
(212) 986-6210

Without Thieu

The best estimates by official American analysts at the moment are that the South Vietnamese government probably cannot survive beyond the month of June even if Congress votes additional aid, which is unlikely. Nguyen Van Thieu's regime has simply fallen apart as a consequence of its own internal rot, and the Communists, who currently control three-quarters of South Vietnam, will soon be in a position to pursue a variety of military options. They can escalate their actions in the Mekong Delta, cut off the food supply to Saigon and besiege the capital, gradually strangling it in much the same way that the Cambodian insurgents have choked Pnompenh. They can attack Saigon directly, counting on the panic of the population to bring the city to its knees, or they may, with their nostalgic memories of Dien Bien Phu, attempt to stage a major fight for Tayninh in the hope that their victory would totally demoralize the South Vietnamese. But, judging from the statements being issued by Hanoi and Vietcong representatives, US specialists submit that the Communists would prefer to avoid the military route and instead negotiate an end to the war. In the opinion of these specialists, the Communists must feel that they can, through talks, conclude the conflict with minimal losses, and they are also presumed to be eager, perhaps for the sake of their public image, to demonstrate that their objective all along has essentially been to implement the terms of the agreement signed in Paris in 1973. The only condition they have posed to the resumption of diplomacy is the removal of Thieu. The question raised by this demand, therefore, is whether the man who has basically been to blame for the present debacle ought to be permitted to block any effort to ease the turmoil nagging Vietnam.

It would be a delusion to think that negotiations at this stage are going to lead to anything but the eventual capitulation of the South Vietnamese government and its replacement by a coalition under Communist domination. For, as Gen. Bedell Smith observed years ago, a defeat on the battlefield cannot be transformed into a triumph at the conference table. But if a South Vietnamese surrender seems shocking, particularly to those who cannot accept the notion of Communists taking over a country, the alternatives could even be worse. One can contemplate, in a struggle to the finish, the sacrifice of thousands of innocent Vietnamese in a bloodbath far more devastat-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing than the systematic crackdown against alleged "enemies of the people" that the Communists can be expected to carry on after they seize power. Thus the immediate imperative in Vietnam is the formation of a new South Vietnamese government that can, within the shortest possible time, reach an agreement with the Communists on a cease-fire and some sort of political accommodation. This will require, as the Communists insist, the ouster of Thieu, and here the US has a role to play.

American officials at the highest levels privately denounce Thieu, contending that he is not only responsible for the present catastrophe but that he could, by displaying greater flexibility over the past two years, have worked out the semblance of an arrangement with the Communists that would have at least bought him the time to consolidate his authority. The same officials currently concede that Thieu must now give way to a fresh Saigon government that has a chance of stabilizing the situation and can, in the process, begin conversations with the Communists. One man capable of establishing such a government is Gen. Duong Van Minh, the most popular officer in South Vietnam. Even the egregious former Premier Nguyen Cao Ky, as far as can be determined, would not be rebuffed by the Communists. A number of generals, among them Cao Van Vien, the chief of staff, and Ngo Quan Truong, the former commander in Hue, are also known to have lost confidence in Thieu and are said to be prepared to move against him. Accustomed as they are to American tutelage, the South Vietnamese are reported to be reluctant to act without a nod from Washington. Under the present circumstances the US ought to give them a quiet signal that the Ford administration believes Thieu has outlived whatever usefulness he may have had. That gesture would not implicate the US directly in a coup d'état, and it might clear the path for a fresh approach. After years of the wrong kind of intervention in Vietnam, the US should grasp an opportunity to undertake a useful sort of intervention.

In this respect the coincidence of Chiang Kai-shek's recent death and the Vietnamese disaster brings to mind certain similarities in US policy toward China in the past and toward Vietnam more lately. As John Fairbank has pointed out, the Westerners who penetrated China during the 19th century associated themselves with the entrenched mandarin ruling class and in fact became, even though they were foreigners, part of that old elite. A principal aim of the Chinese revolution was to smash the ancient power structure, along with the Westerners who belonged to it. Hence US influence in China, which sought to manifest itself through Chiang, was doomed as long as it was aligned with traditionalists who were unable to adjust to changing conditions. A feature of the older order that hindered its ability to modernize was its tendency to place family security above patriotism and to seek advancement through the favors of superiors rather than through public service. This ethic engendered the corruption and ineptitude of the Chiang group, and, despite billions of dollars in American aid, it was no match for the Communists, who successfully mobilized common people in promoting their revolution. In Vietnam, the US pinned its aspirations on mandarins like Ngo Dinh Diem and Thieu, who, like Chiang, could

Now, lessee, Mr. Thieu—I'm sure we can salvage something here.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not cope with a Communist movement that had assumed control of the country's nationalist dynamic, which, as in China, linked Americans and the French before them to the old ruling class. But the US made a mistake in Vietnam that it had averted in China. Thanks to the wisdom of Gen. George Marshall, who perceived that the commitment of American troops to the Asian mainland was the road to nowhere, the US turned away from the Chinese civil war and left Chiang to his fate. And today even the most conservative Republicans return from visits to Peking to proclaim that the average Chinese is undoubtedly better off under communism than he would have been had China been roiled in internal strife for a quarter-century. The American engagement in Vietnam was partly motivated at its origin by a compulsion to compensate for the US retreat from China and the stalemate in Korea. The result has been the devastation of a country and an imminent Communist takeover that would have occurred, less painfully, years earlier. Perhaps one day in the future hawkish Republicans will return from visits to a Communist Vietnam to announce that, after all, the Vietnamese are better off than they were during the war that might have dragged on endlessly had the US continued to assist the Saigon regime.

Despite President Ford's warnings that the collapse of the South Vietnamese regime will undermine US credibility around the world, Americans are in no mood to rush to the rescue with funds that, they appear to feel, would be better spent at home. A Harris survey conducted last month, for example, showed that only 17 percent of Americans favored supplementary aid of $300 million to the Saigon regime, and that lack of enthusiasm for helping South Vietnam is mirrored on Capitol Hill, where congressmen are overwhelmingly cool to the idea of further assistance to the Thieu government. Secretary of State Kissinger, arguing for aid to South Vietnam, has also emphasized that "we cannot abandon friends in one part of the world without jeopardizing the security of friends everywhere." But this attempt to breathe life into the "domino theory" has made little headway. *The New York Times'* diplomatic correspondent, Leslie Gelb, noted not long ago that foreign leaders gauge their relations with the US according to their own experience with Washington rather than on the basis of American conduct in Indochina. Reports from Moscow and Peking suggest, moreover, that neither the Russians nor the Chinese intend to take advantage of the events in Vietnam to revise their attitudes toward the US.

Vice President Rockefeller embarrassed the administration the other day when he said that "it's really too late to do anything" about Vietnam. But he was correct only up to a point. The US still has the leverage to steer Thieu's opponents in the direction of a move that could, if nothing more, reduce tensions and avert bloodshed in the transitional phase that lies ahead in Vietnam. And the US has the obligation, exercised perhaps through international organizations tolerated by the Communists, to contribute heavily to the care of the hordes of Vietnamese refugees who are, for the most part, victims of a war they have never understood.

Secret Pledges

On January 25, 1973, following the conclusion of the Paris agreement, Henry Kissinger categorically stated that "there are no secret understandings" concerning Vietnam. And a year later, in a letter to Sen. Edward Kennedy, he declared more specifically that the US "has no bilateral written commitment" to the South Vietnamese government. But last week, after Sen. Henry Jackson alleged that former President Nixon had privately given assurances to South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu, the White House conceded that the US had promised that it would react vigorously on behalf of the Saigon regime in the event that the North Vietnamese violated the Paris accords. Did Mr. Nixon and Kissinger pledge the resumption of American bombing of North Vietnam? Did they vow to send Thieu increased amounts of military aid? How did Thieu interpret the Nixon administration's apparent suggestion that it would not tolerate another Communist offensive? At this writing the answers to these questions are unknown, and they will not be known until further details on the subject are forthcoming. The fact that there were secret exchanges with Saigon, however, points to deep and serious flaws in the conduct of American government.

To have circumvented the constitutional process, which holds that the public through Congress has the right to consider arrangements made by the US with foreign nations, was not unique to this case. For the war in Vietnam itself was never actually ratified by the legislative branch, and thus the use of secrecy and dissimulation was a logical extension of the tendency to ignore legal procedures. Former President Nixon reflected this attitude in his repeated contentions that "national security," as he defined it, had precedence over the law. It is an approach that holds that the conduct of foreign policy is too arcane a process to be

COMING: the mismanaged
global oil utility—
a report by
Josiah Lee Auspitz

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

submitted to a volatile legislature for approval or denial. But as Secretary Kissinger himself has argued, a foreign policy that lacks popular support is bound to founder.

It is fair to surmise that the Nixon administration's pledge to Thieu, however it was outlined, persuaded the South Vietnamese leader that he could resist political compromise with the Communists under the terms of the Paris agreement because the US would rescue him if Hanoi returned to the military route. This may account for his intransigence since 1973, and therefore such agreements as there were have contributed to the present debacle in Vietnam.

Bad Investments

The problems the large American banks have experienced in managing foreign exchange, described in these pages last week, have recently been matched by a new strain on their finances at home. The domestic trouble began to develop last summer as the full impact of the energy crunch made itself felt, and then came to a head early this year. The difficulty stems from the banks' having invested too heavily in monster land development corporations otherwise known as Real Estate Investment Trusts or REITs. The REITs were in trouble, to trace the problem one step further, because they had put too much of their money into the construction of high-rise office buildings (many of which remain empty) and resort housing, particularly condominiums. *Business Week* recently reported that about 50 percent of the REIT losses have cropped up in "recreation and second-home areas" that depend on a "booming and energy-rich economy" to make them saleable. People are not buying summer houses; companies are not renting new office space. The REITs are shuddering, and one worth $206 million has already gone bankrupt. As a result, the REITs cannot pay off the interest on the loans they have taken from the big banks, and the banks' profits are suffering.

Some of the banks with the largest REIT liabilities are Bankers Trust, the Chemical Bank of New York, First Chicago, Continental of Illinois and Chase Manhattan. These are big enough to absorb the REIT losses and still survive. Smaller banks may not. Why did they get so deeply involved in this risky business? In some cases banks gave help to REITs they had fathered. Chase Manhattan, for example, advises and tutors an independent offspring called the Chase Manhattan Mortgage and Realty Trust, the biggest REIT of them all. As *Business Week* put it, the bank has no legal obligation to lend aid, "but it is hard to imagine the world's third largest bank letting a REIT that shares its name go down the drain." Kinship is a strong bond, and so the Chase lent its wayward child nearly the maximum amount allowed by law. Another reason the banks helped out the REITs is that they were told to do so by the government. Former member of the Federal Reserve Board Andrew Brimmer testified to this fact in February. He told the House Banking Committee that the Fed asked banks to lend money to the REITs last summer. Brimmer said that he and other Fed members felt "that was a necessary action. At the time, the real estate investment trusts were in a great deal of trouble." The Fed's directors thought a series of REIT failures might start a financial panic, and to prevent that from happening, they engineered a rescue of the REITs. Now the banks are stuck with the consequences.

The big banks have just come through a bad year, bad enough that the Comptroller of the Currency felt compelled to say a couple of weeks ago that they are *not* in danger of collapsing. However their problems aren't over. One international expert on the Fed's staff said recently that at least in the currency trading departments, "everyone is running scared." Though the bankers seem calmer now than they were six months ago, a new heavy dose of inflation, the capricious investment of OPEC oil profits or a new embargo would quickly throw them into turmoil again.

Too Little, Too Late

In its first few days the "babylift" out of Vietnam, as the headline writers called it, proved a disaster. Begun with the best intentions, the evacuation quickly degenerated into a panicky and chaotic scramble to rush Vietnamese orphans out of the battle zone and into the waiting arms of adoptive American parents. It started with an unauthorized flight from Saigon arranged and legalized at the last minute by the pistol-packing owner of World Airways, Edward Daly. He loaded one of his charter jets with 52 orphans and defied the officials to stop him. He was told his plane was not properly equipped to carry infants and sick children. His answer: How are they going to stop the plane, shoot it down? He and his cargo made the trip safely and arrived in California greeted by a cheering crowd.

It was about this time that President Ford decided to join the act. He ordered the air force to send planes to Vietnam to pick up 2000 waiting orphans and bring them back to the United States. The first flight, carrying more than 300 people including 243 children, crashed shortly after takeoff. One hundred and seventy-eight were killed. The cause of the crash hasn't been determined, but the pilot reported that he lost control of the plane when a cargo door blew out and caused the air pressure to drop. Some people suggested the plane was sabotaged. But there were other suspicions. The plane the government chose for this

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

critical first mission was a C-5A, the biggest military crate that flies, a giant cargo transport that's never worked properly. Sen. William Proxmire has hounded the military about the C-5A for years, ever since he learned that design flaws caused engine supports and wings to crack and drop off in test flights. Proxmire thinks the C-5A may be an unsalvageable dud, and that the government should consider cancelling its contract with the builder, Lockheed. Proxmire has written to officials in the Pentagon to find out why they decided to use the C-5A, a plane not designed for passengers, and certainly not suitable for carrying infants. He plans an investigation. The remainder of the evacuation flights were scheduled on commercial charters.

Even these later flights, arranged by private charities, were not well managed. When the planes touched down in San Francisco and Seattle, the doctors who rushed aboard found that many of the infants were near death. Of approximately 700 brought over in the first two planes, more than 60 were sent to hospitals in critical condition. The flight crews that had taken care of the children were exhausted, and one plane was nearly out of milk and water when it landed. The news didn't prevent President Ford from making an appearance at the airport with his wife and symbolically carrying a Vietnamese child or two onto American soil. At this writing there are no immediate plans to evacuate more Vietnamese children.

The children who made the 20-hour trip across the Pacific and landed safely in American hospitals, it is said, might not have lived had they been left in Saigon. The evacuations are also described as "rescue flights," as if the children were being saved from certain death at the hands of the North Vietnamese. While it is true that the orphans who made it may now have a better chance of living into old age, this attitude ignores some difficult questions. Why, for example, were arrangements for the care of these children left to the last moment? Why has the President shown such a sudden and dramatic interest in Vietnamese children? What will be done for the thousands who will not leave Vietnam?

Sen. Edward Kennedy is one of those who has consistently tried to draw the government's attention to the needs of Vietnamese children. As chairman of the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on refugees he made several detailed inquiries into the use of aid funds in Indochina during 1972 and 1973. Kennedy particularly emphasized the need for programs to move refugees (11 million of them in Vietnam last year) out of disease-ridden camps and back onto the farmland, to rehabilitate those blinded or crippled in the war, to finance hospitals and orphanages and to speed up the process by which orphans are sent to families that want to adopt them outside Vietnam. In hearings last July Kennedy asked whether the money provided to the State Department for support of child welfare programs in Vietnam was being spent well. Wells Klein, the director of the American Council for Nationalities Service and a member of a delegation sent by Kennedy to review programs in Indochina, answered that except for funds spent on adoption, the money was being processed very slowly. Adoption services were well managed, he said, because the administration "was more under the gun on this question—under congressional and public pressure." But aid to children who would *not* leave Vietnam, the need for which was far greater, was not coming through. Wells pointed out that while there were only about 20,000 children in orphanages last year (about 1700 scheduled for adoption by foreigners) there were 880,000 children who had lost at least one parent and needed some kind of assistance. Klein said that "further preoccupation with inter-country adoption, as against other child welfare services, would pose a false issue working to the detriment of those tens of thousands of disadvantaged children for whom Vietnam is, and will always be home." He suggested aid could best be provided through international agencies like UNICEF, the World Health Organization and the UN High Commission for Refugees. When these hearings were held, the UN had not ventured far in Vietnam because it lacked funds, because the United States didn't want to encourage projects that might lend support to the North Vietnamese and because fighting was still going on.

Some progress has been made since then, but direct humanitarian aid to South Vietnam continued to move very slowly until about a month ago. The administrator of the Agency for International Development, Daniel Parker, testified last week that the government had "obligated" all the funds Congress had provided this year for humanitarian aid in Vietnam. However his statement reflected a quick policy shuffle. A few days before he testified, according to a member of the Senate refugees subcommittee staff, less than half this money had been scheduled for use. Dale De Haan, chief counsel for the committee, said that when he spoke to an AID official on April 5, he was told that only four million dollars of $10 million Congress intended to be spent on child welfare this fiscal year had been obligated. In the same way only $15.7 million of $55.7 million approved for the general category of humanitarian aid had been released for use.

The government has been slow to spend the money for predictable reasons: military aid always gets first attention, and secondly, the institutions that could use humanitarian aid are not fully developed. One of the reasons for their backwardness is that they were shortchanged in earlier years, and some people believe the White House cynically refrained from spending money on Congress' favorite projects to get other bills passed. For example Wells Klein said last July: "I think the child welfare program was held in abeyance until the foreign aid bill [of fiscal 1974] was passed, as a quid pro quo." The delay between Congress' approval of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

funds for child welfare programs in Vietnam and the government's decision to spend them last year was more than 10 months.

Sen. Kennedy recently has spoken of the "paralysis of our government" and the tendency of our leaders to "wring their hands" and "take refuge in the familiar patterns of the past." Though Kennedy hasn't said so, his comments seemed directed at Henry Kissinger, the designer of the Vietnam peace accords of 1973 and the official with the largest personal investment in the Nixon-Ford Indochina policies. Kennedy has proposed a six-point alternative program of his own, backed with legislation, that essentially redirects the thrust of American involvement in Vietnam away from military action toward a new nonpartisan concern for the welfare of the Vietnamese. Kennedy would have the President appoint a special envoy to pursue a "negotiated settlement," a return to the "goals" of the 1973 Paris accords and an arrangement for a massive rehabilitation of the Vietnamese economy. He would funnel most of the aid through international agencies, primarily the UN. In effect Kennedy proposes that the United States abandon as tactfully as possible its commitment to Nguyen Van Thieu and settle its differences with North Vietnam on a bilateral basis. A glut of aid would follow. It is a humane solution.

A Note on Commitments

"Commitment" was once an existentialist term, used in such a way as to put personal honor into the center of political life. It suggested a new kind of hero—a proud, independent man, without illusions, who staked his life on a chosen cause. Now the term is applied not to individuals but to states; it is a word in the mouth of officials, a stock phrase of political apologetics. We have heard it often in the past 10 years, and now again with a vengeance, as our "commitment" to the people of Vietnam is revealed as the hollow thing it always was. We had to fight in Vietnam, Johnson and Nixon told us, because we had committed ourselves to fight there. We made commitments at Paris, spokesmen for the Thieu regime tell us, that we have violated in the years since. The refusal right now to resume bombing the North, says Gen. Westmoreland, or to send more money and military equipment, says President Ford, breaks faith with the Vietnamese government and people. Most of us, I suspect, recognize in a vague and uneasy way that there is something to these statements—even if the policies they suggest are politically and morally insane. *National honor,* that Victorian relic of colonial adventures, still has an attractive sound. But what does it mean? And what does it require? If there is a way for a whole people to be without illusions and still act honorably, surely we need to find it.

The Vietnam war was never what our leaders said it was. The word "commitment" radically misdescribes its reasons, and it deliberately invites a similarly false description of our withdrawal from the war. If we still have responsibilities in Vietnam, it's not because we supported the South Vietnamese "fight for freedom," or because we pledged ourselves to Nguyen Van Thieu, or joined in the Paris peace agreements. It's because of actions of a far more unilateral character. Commitment between states (as between rational adults) implies mutuality: shared decision-making, shared risk. But mutuality was always a sham in Vietnam. Our policy in that country was self-centered from the start, shamelessly unconcerned with the freedom, or the safety, of other people. The case is not the same, however, in other parts of the world, and for that reason the false characterization of Vietnam is dangerous. It discredits the idea of national commitment, much as Victorian hypocrisy discredited the idea of national honor. Both are good ideas, at least they might be, if understood properly.

It is Congress above all that is today accused of breaking faith with Vietnam. In response to that accusation, it is tempting to suggest that commitments made to President Thieu, at Paris and before, were not national commitments at all, but only personal promises. They were Nixon's or Kissinger's promises, not ours, for we did not know about them; Congress was never asked to ratify them or even to discuss them. Certainly national commitments ought to be publicly debated, ought to be the subject of political examination; and the fate of the Paris agreements must make us and others wary of peace settlements guaranteed by American leaders without the support of the American people.

But the argument that there can be no national commitment except through constitutional processes also rings a false note. It misses the essential wrongness of our Vietnam policy, and that has nothing to do with constitutionalism. If it were possible to be obligated to the Thieu regime, Nixon's and Kissinger's promises would in fact bind us all. Commitment isn't only or primarily a matter of formal alliances or of treaties ratified by the Senate—any more than obligation in private life is a matter of notary publics and solemn oaths. We are bound to our friends, for example, because of things we have said and done that inspire confidence and arouse expectations, because of implicit promises, even if we have never exchanged vows. In friendship, as in love and politics, there are marriages less than canonical, but binding nonetheless. Nations too can be bound in unofficial and informal ways, on the basis of words spoken away from the public stage, even without words spoken at all. Consider the famous case of Britain, France and Czechoslovakia in 1938; France

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had a treaty with the Czechs; Britain did not; the House of Commons had never debated a commitment to the Prague government. Britain and France, however, share equally in the infamy of Munich.

But if national commitments can be informal, they cannot—and here they are unlike friendships—be personal. They don't arise because two leaders establish cordial relations. Political bonds must be mediated by political institutions. We can say that Britain and France were bound to protect Czechoslovakia against Nazi aggression only because the Czechs had an anti-Nazi government, a legitimate and popular government that asked for protection. And it is because South Vietnam never had such a government that our commitment there was always spurious. We supported one clique of anti-Communist generals and then another clique, but our promises were always made to men whose political fate depended above all on us. They were very much like promises *to* ourselves—which are never good reasons for interfering in the affairs of other people. We never succeeded in establishing a moral connection to the Vietnamese nation. Particular Vietnamese became our collaborators, and to them we have obligations of a deep and serious kind. But there was never an independent government, popularly supported, with which we could make an alliance.

I don't want to defend the strong claim that obligations are only possible between free and democratic states. There aren't enough such states; the assertion would not begin to account for the moral texture of international politics. But a somewhat weaker version of the claim is true: obligations can only arise between states whose governments have a significant degree of local legitimacy. We were able to commit ourselves to the people of West Berlin, for example, because there was a government in West Berlin willing and able to accept that commitment in the name of the people. We are able today to enter into commitments, and we have done so, with countries like Britain, Holland, Germany, Japan, Australia, Israel—where political institutions are solidly based and truly representative. But it was never possible to commit ourselves to the Vietnamese people (only to individuals among them), for as a people they have never been represented in international politics. Nor did we ever try to seek out representative men and women; we sought only puppets. And we could no more establish a moral obligation to fight in Vietnam by committing ourselves to our puppets, than the Russians could establish an obligation to fight in Hungary by committing themselves to Rakosi or Kadar.

All this is not to say that we are without obligations in Vietnam. We were probably bound to stay out of a civil war into which we were invited chiefly by ourselves. Once in, we were certainly bound to fight in accordance with those international laws of war that we have publicly recognized and accepted—to protect civilian lives, to avoid wanton destruction of homes and property, to provide benevolent quarantine for prisoners of war and so on. Having failed to do any of these things, we are bound now to offer reparations, to participate in or at least help pay for the rebuilding of the country and the resettlement of its people. And finally we are bound to help those men and women whom we have compromised, to provide a refuge for them if they can't, of if they think they can't, live safely in a Communist state. These are not obligations that are mediated by any government except our own. Since our own leaders have some significant degree of local legitimacy, we are all implicated by and responsible for their actions. Responsibilities are duties that don't necessarily arise from commitments, but they are duties nonetheless. And here our national honor is indeed at stake.

Michael Walzer

White House Watch

Ford and Crisis

Here is an account of how the President and some of his assistants conducted themselves in late March and early April, a time of severe crisis at home and abroad and a time, too, of test and reexamination of both domestic and foreign policy.

For Mr. Ford and his closest assistants, it was a time of paradox in their personal relationships and in their views of each other. He seemed to some of his assistants to be ever surer of himself, ever firmer in his decisions, less and less inhibited by his previously acute awareness that he is the nation's first appointed and unelected President. He seemed, in short, to the people around him to be "more presidential" with every passing day. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, whose policies and performance confronted the President with some of his most difficult problems and choices, marveled to other officials and to reporters at Mr. Ford's serenity, his calm acceptance of trouble and his cool search for remedies. Yet at this same time and among these same people there was more dispute about what the President should do, more doubt of his judgment and more questioning of his choices and decisions than there had been since he succeeded Richard Nixon last August 9.

The differences around the President ranged from the momentous to the trivial. All of them were indicative of the way in which he and his presidency were developing. His decision to sign rather than veto the messy tax reduction bill that Congress presented to him in late March was preceded by a sharp divison among his counsellors that was widely reported and readily confirmed by his spokesmen. Chairman Arthur

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Burns of the Federal Reserve Board and Treasury Secretary William Simon urged him to veto the bill. Chairman Alan Greenspan of the Council of Economic Advisers and the President's long-time friend and staff economics counsellor, L. William Seidman, urged him to sign it. The interesting thing was that the outcome represented the President's first decision to do something of importance that he believed to be wrong. His behavior during his first weeks in the presidency indicated that he entered the office in the hope that at long last, after 25 years of bargaining and equivocation in the House of Representatives, he would have the power and the freedom to do in large matters only what he believed to be right. His pardon of Richard Nixon was the first sign of his determination to behave in that fashion. His early vetoes, made with very little consideration of whether they would or wouldn't be sustained, brought upon him much admonition from the Republican floor leaders, Senator Hugh Scott and Representative John Rhodes, to the effect that he had to heed political and congressional reality more than he was initially inclined to do. His signing of the tax bill completed his retreat from the arbitrary standard of rightness that he had set for himself. He was prepared to accept, as he said, the net revenue reduction of $23 billion rather than the $16 billion he had recommended. But his distaste for the extraneous amendments added to the reduction itself and for the threats of truly monstrous deficits that the total bill enhanced was so strongly expressed, to congressional leaders and to his assistants, that several of his own people thought 24 hours before he announced his decision to sign that he was going to veto and insist that Congress enact an early, uncluttered substitute of the kind he had originally proposed.

His resolution of other differences expressed to him suggested that "more presidential" could be interpreted to mean "more stubborn." Several of his assistants, for instance, believed and told him that he was making a mistake in dashing off to Palm Springs, California for an Easter weekend and a following week of vacation in millionaire style, at the home of a millionaire friend, right after signing the tax cut bill, while South Vietnam and Cambodia were crumbling under military attack, and just after his and Henry Kissinger's Middle East policy had fallen apart. By the Friday noon before his departure from Washington, his determination to go anyway had been so clearly and crisply indicated that the only question remaining was when he should go. Press Secretary Ronald Nessen suggested in the last of several memos on the subject that Mr. Ford at least let a decent interval elapse between signing the unsatisfactory tax bill and flying to California. The President brushed the suggestion aside and left when he'd intended to. Mr. Ford saw some acrid cartoons and commentaries, contrasting his play in the desert sun with his professions of sympathy for the human suffering and horror being portrayed in television reports from Vietnam. His associates gathered that he was sorry critics felt that way but he really didn't give a damn. Nessen never mentioned in his public briefings in Washington, though he did mention privately to a few reporters, a fact that if publicized could have taken some of the edge off the criticism. The minimized fact was that this was the Ford family's ninth Easter in Palm Springs. The place is a habit with Gerald Ford, a habit he wasn't about to break. The reason for obscuring the fact could have been that from the millionaire friend's house where he stayed this time he could look down on the lush, synthetic oasis of the Walter Annenberg estate, where President Nixon arranged for him to stay last year. Reminders of Gerald Ford's prior identity with Richard Nixon are not in fashion at the Ford White House. Assurances that the President wasn't sponging were in fashion. He paid $100 a day to the friend who owned the Palm Springs house and vacated it for the Fords. A three-bedroom suite at the Tennis Club Hotel, one of many luxury hostelries in the vicinity, would have cost $165 a day.

There were small signs of a certain defensiveness in contrast with the show and, in my view, the fact of growing presidential posture and firmness. There were several side trips to San Francisco, San Diego and Las Vegas for speeches, a press conference, a conference of community leaders, and the like. Two of them were to the Elk Hills naval oil reserve, which is soon to be opened to commercial exploitation in the name of energy independence, and to a cluster of natural geysers north of San Francisco. Murmurs that the Elk Hills visit was nothing but a show for media purposes caused Nessen to say that reporters who thought so were welcome to pass up a subsequent visit to the geysers, where a modest amount of geothermal power is derived. The President was going, Nessen said, with or without reporters and cameramen. All of them went, in rain and misery and to no great purpose. Another side trip was from Palm Springs to the San Francisco international airport, where Mr. Ford greeted 325 Vietnamese orphans who arrived on a privately chartered Boeing 747. A few reporters were privileged to stand for an hour in a driving rain in order to watch the President lug two orphans down the plane ramp and into an army bus. The laudable purpose was to dramatize the President's and the country's sympathy for the victims of the Vietnam tragedy. In the Ford entourage after the trip, there was an uneasy feeling that it had been a mistake. Some of the organizers of the event had made it clear that they regarded the President's presence as an unnecessary complication in an already complicated situation. Besides, it was poorly timed for national television notice. What I as one of the few reporters present got out of it was colossally unimportant proof that Mr. Ford had the same look of benign concern when he carried the orphans down the ramp that he displayed when he gazed upon 3500

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

broadcasters and wives whom he addressed in Las Vegas on his way back to Washington.

Foreign affairs, or rather the progressive collapse of the United States position in Cambodia and South Vietnam, dominated the news during the Palm Springs week despite Mr. Ford's efforts to keep at least a portion of public attention focused upon the threat—very dire and very real, in my opinion—of more and truly disastrous inflation if the fiscal 1976 deficit is not held reasonably near the $60 billion that the President is prepared to tolerate. In what follows it is assumed that readers have had their fill of the rhetoric in speeches and at press conferences with which the President and Henry Kissinger have announced and reiterated their refusal to "furl the flag" and have asserted their belief that the world is in as great and widespread a need of United States leadership as it's ever been since World War II. The purpose here is briefly to summarize reasons for suspecting that a much broader recognition of change both in the world and in the United States stance toward the world is in process at the peak of American policy than is evident in the rhetoric, and that a change in the relationship that Henry Kissinger has enjoyed with two Presidents, Nixon and Ford, is also in process.

My chief reason for suspecting a greater change in the American stance than the rhetoric indicates is that the rhetoric is so worn, so extreme and so irrelevant to manifest public and congressional attitudes that it would have to be adjudged downright irrational if it were not in fact intended to provide a sort of protective preparation and cover for the very shrinkage of United States responsibility and influence that the President has been saying he will not permit or encourage. A secondary reason is knowledge that within the Ford establishment there is a belief, embryonic at this point but growing, that the President in his own interest and in the interest of creating public belief that there is a *Ford* policy must somehow disassociate himself from policies that are indelibly identified with Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon. In Palm Springs my attention was authoritatively called to a passage in a *Chicago Tribune* interview with Mr. Ford last February 9. When the President was asked, "Did you ever think what would happen to our foreign policy if something should happen to Dr. Kissinger?," Mr. Ford was seen by two people who were present to tense up and answer with unusual emphasis. He said in part: "I think first we are lucky to have a man of that outstanding capability available during this very critical period. I don't know just how the decisions were made before I became President, but I can tell you that the final decisions in these cases today are made by me. I get recommendations or I get options from him or from the National Security Council, so that although he is extremely valuable and I think most important, it doesn't mean that he makes the decisions."

Mr. Ford asked Kissinger to stay and Kissinger promised on March 24 to stay through the present term. But that was only a phase of a continuing process of change. In Palm Springs and then in Washington, on the probably specious claim that he'd been "misinformed" by an NSC assistant, Nessen opened an attack on the Kissinger system of keeping the White House press staff informed on foreign policy matters that no press secretary would have dared to attempt a few months ago. At a party in Palm Springs, Mr. Ford was overheard saying to Nessen something like: "I've taken care of that. How often do I have to tell you, *he* is not the President. *I* am the President." An official who was privy to the conversation said later that it concerned Henry Kissinger and a matter other than the aforementioned staff flap.

John Osborne

Spain and Portugal

Our Iberian Presence

Rota, Spain

Although the Pentagon frequently exaggerates the importance of its overseas bases, this is not the case with the naval base at Rota or the air force base in Portugal's Azores. Both are of high strategic value—and treaties permitting the American use of both are now up for renegotiation. As the political turmoil increases on the Iberian peninsula their futures look bleaker every day.

Rota sits on Spain's Atlantic coast about 60 miles from the Straits of Gibraltar to the south and Portugal's border to the north. The tightly guarded base, which has a fine deep-water port and an excellent airfield, is a spacious enclosure of palm trees and sand dunes, with scattered settlements of whitewashed barracks and brown stucco houses with carports. It is home for 10,000 American servicemen and their dependents.

The other day when I visited the port I saw a submarine lashed beside a large mother ship like a black Moby Dick, its missile snout covered with canvas. The submarines of Rota, along with those based at Holy Loch, Scotland, make up the US undersea nuclear defense system in Western Europe. Each sub carries 16 Poseidon missiles capable of sending multiple warheads to any target in the Mediterranean. Not far from the submarine were two helicopter-carrier ships with the US marines aboard who would serve as shock troops for any American intervention in the Mideast. Almost every Sixth Fleet ship entering or departing the Mediterranean stops at this strategic supply-and-repair station.

The US air force also uses three Spanish airbases. Two of them, Torrejon and Zaragoza, are of relative

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

importance. Torrejon is on Madrid's outskirts and Zaragoza is midway between Madrid and Barcelona. Because of its pro-Arab policy Spain refused to let the US use any of the bases in direct support of Israel during the 1973 Mideast war, but large KC-135 tankers operating from Torrejon were used to refuel Israel-bound supply planes. Zaragoza was reactivated in 1969 after the US was kicked out of Wheelus in Libya and is used for gunnery and bombing training. Both bases would assume a greater strategic value if Portugal asked the US to leave the Azores.

Encouraged by Turkey and Greece's tough contra-American stands, Spain is determined to get what it considers a fair price for Rota and the airbases. Spain is not a member of NATO and since the US lost an atomic bomb off the Spanish coast a few years ago Spaniards have felt the risks they take in making the bases available far exceed the remuneration they have received—an estimated $300 million in assistance under the treaty that expires in September.

The Spanish government would like a bilateral defense treaty with the US. Mr. Kissinger has said this is out of the question given the mood of Congress. The Pentagon has begun to sweeten the pot with a squadron of Phantom jets, and probably some interim deal will be worked out in terms of new military equipment that Spain feels it may need in a confrontation with Morocco over the phosphate-rich Spanish Sahara. Or should Portugal continue its leftward course Spain may be asked to join NATO after being excluded all these years because of the Franco dictatorship.

Any arrangement that is made, however, must take into consideration two obvious factors: that the Franco government is on its last legs; and that the majority of Spaniards don't want an American military presence at any price. An invitation to join NATO coupled with support for Spain's entry into the Common Market would go a long way to defusing opposition at least temporarily. Madrileños in particular have visions of a Russian missile aimed at the Torrejon airbase falling short into the Plaza Mayor, and they might become more amenable to an American presence if Torrejon's military business were transferred to Zaragoza.

But the offer of a membership card to the shaky NATO club is unlikely to overwhelm the basic reality of the wavering American popularity in Spain. The only point seeming to unite Spanish politicians these days is their contra-Americanism, and much depends on them. Franco's right-wing heir apparent, Adm. Luis Carrero Blanco, was assassinated by Basque terrorists 14 months ago. Since then Premier Carlos Arias Navarro has tried to ease off the lid of political repression in a manner that would preserve the ideals and power of the Franco regime while yielding a centimeter at a time to demands for democratization.

The interesting thing about Arias' program is not what it has done for democracy—which is predictably very little—but what it has done to weaken the troglodytes of the right who have ruled for the past 36 years. Although sniped at by both moderate left and extreme right, Arias has a degree of support among the growing car and television middle class, which is basically conservative but would like political reforms as well as continuing stability.

That stability is still at least partially ensured by the shrunken presence of the 82-year-old Franco, who, despite increasingly vocal opposition, maintains his personal popularity. His role is mainly symbolic now, limited to ceremonial occasions where as a government ploy he is televised greeting dignitaries. "If Franco could just hang on another five years it would give Arias time to ripen the fruit of political freedom," says Alvaro Gross Garret, former manager of 3M in Spain. No one expects he will. A joke making the rounds concerns the Spaniard who is guided by a Russian to Lenin's tomb. "Pero esto es nada," says the Spaniard. "Ours even shakes hands."

British writer Gerald Brenan, whose *Spanish Labyrinth* taught us all about Spanish policy, sees a future semi-dictatorship with a strong military in control. The army's power will be eroded over a period of years but will not end abruptly unless the economic situation deteriorates to the point that the country demands a drastic change. "Such economic deterioration," Brenan told me recently, "is now an ever present possibility." Already foreign tourism, the country's prime source of hard currency, is declining; Spain's large emigrant work force is returning home to unemployment and labor unrest after losing jobs in France and Germany because of the recession; and inflation is skyrocketing.

After Franco will come a deluge of political parties. Last summer during his illness, when power was temporarily placed in the hands of his designated successor, the 37-year-old Prince Juan Carlos, an opposition coalition led by socialists and Communists sprang up and is now clandestinely active throughout the country. Several of its leaders have been arrested. Even under Premier Arias' restrictive law allowing "political associations" for the first time since the war, other centrist groups have begun to stir openly. The post-Franco era will see at least five major political parties and numerous smaller factions. The prospect is for strikes, demonstrations and frequent cabinet shake-ups as Latin-style coalitions are formed and riven. In short the kind of politics the Iberians long ago exported to South America is returning home to the peninsula.

A big question is the emerging middle class, which undoubtedly will align itself with the centrist Christian Democrats. Will it be strong enough and reformist enough to provide a national backbone for a new political system? And another unknown as always is the Communists, who are thought to be well organized and encouraged by the success of their Portuguese

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

counterparts.

Yet it is these two groups that make it highly unlikely Spain will travel in the direction of Portugal's revolution. Portugal is much less developed and lacks Spain's large middle class, which vividly remembers the horrors of the civil war. Portugal's revolution has taken place in a situation where 200 families still controlled 75 percent of the country's wealth. Moreover Spain's Communists are considered liberal rather than radical by Spaniards who oppose them. The Spanish Communist leader, Santiago Carrillo, who is in Paris exile, has spoken critically of the extremism of Portugal's Communist party. "They are against political plurality," he says. "We are for it."

With the leftist Gen. Vasco dos Goncalves as the country's premier, Portugal's Communists have a remarkable opening to power, which they have used effectively. The government has taken on an increasingly Marxist coloration since Gen. Antonio de Spínola's feeble coup d'état attempt last month and now includes two Communist ministers and several Marxist economists in key planning jobs. The Armed Forces Movement has banned three political parties standing to the left and right of the Communists from participating in the constituent assembly elections scheduled for April 25, and this too is sure to enhance the Communists' power though it is not likely to result in their gaining an electoral majority.

The question now is whether Portugal will withdraw, as France and Greece have, from NATO's integrated command. NATO's charter includes no machinery for expelling a member state but the US has begun to lobby with the 13 other participating nations for measures to "quarantine" Lisbon. Portugal may well decide to anticipate such moves by resigning. At any rate NATO in southern Europe is clearly going the moribund way of SEATO in Asia—a fact recognized by the House Foreign Affairs Committee when it somewhat wistfully suggested in a recent report that NATO be replaced by a new European defense arrangement that would include Portugal, Greece, Turkey and Spain.

The US treaty for the airbase in the Azores, which was used during the last Mideast crisis, has expired. Nothing is likely to be decided, though, in the short run unless Portugal quits NATO. The US will continue to use the base while the Portuguese buy time by drawing out negotiations for a new treaty. But the airbase's days seem numbered. Lisbon has declined comment on a report that it would give Moscow port facilities on Madeira Island. It is probable, however, that a well entrenched leftist regime would grant such rights, and possibly from that beginning could eventually grow Russia's Rota in the Atlantic.

By any measure the events in Portugal and Spain suggest a diminished American future in this part of the world. Just what this portends for our nuclear submarine base at Rota we shall better know when Franco stops shaking hands.

Zalin Grant

Zalin Grant reports on Southern Europe from Spain. He is the author of *Just Survivors,* which will be published by Norton this fall.

An Experiment Designed to Fail

The New Medicine

by Paul Starr

The reform of medical care has been such a perennial source of discouragement and frustration that the apparent failure of yet another attempt to reorganize the system hardly seems an arresting turn of events. In December 1973, with support from both Sen. Kennedy and President Nixon, Congress approved a long awaited measure ostensibly aimed at promoting "health maintenance organizations"—health plans that, for a fixed, annual prepayment, provide both hospital care and medical services, either through group practices or associations of individual physicians. While many plans have been doing well on their own for decades, the federal program to encourage new ones isn't.

Since its passage the HMO Act has been more of a deterrent than a source of assistance to new prepaid plans. The provisions of the law are so rigid in their

Paul Starr is fellow in law, science and medicine at the Yale Law School.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

requirements for HMOs and so uncertain in their benefits that they have discouraged developing health plans, confused employers and unions, demoralized officials involved in the program, and disenchanted the field of health policy at large. None of this was necessary but it is now an accomplished fact; and neither the administration nor Congress seems to have the will or the clarity of purpose to change it.

Prepaid plans have long faced bitter opposition from the medical profession, which for the last half century has struggled to preserve fee-for-service solo practice. Now they face a new kind of obstacle—government regulation instituted in the name of reform that nevertheless tends to lock the medical system into its existing structure. This is a misfortune not only for the health plans and their members, but for the public at large. Under the current fee-for-service system, comprehensive national health insurance would be intolerably costly, and consequently is continually postponed. Without structural reform the public cannot be given financial relief. The HMO program had been seen by many as the groundwork for long-term reorganization. For just that reason it was vigorously fought by the American Medical Association.

The current dimensions of the HMO program, compared to early forecasts, can be graphically illustrated by a few figures. The HMO bill originally introduced by Sen. Kennedy called for expenditures of over five billion dollars in three years; the Senate cut that back to one billion dollars. When the legislation finally passed Congress, it was down to $325 million over five years. This fiscal year HEW has had available some $72 million in grants and loans but, with a few months remaining, has spent only about $10 million. Because of the law's inflexibility, the agency can't use up even its limited appropriations. Next year's budget will be reduced accordingly. At the meager level of expenditure now being contemplated, the HMO program can no longer be considered a serious federal effort.

Just how damaging this situation will be to the spread of HMOs remains unclear. Most of the plans now in operation have begun without federal assistance. Dr. Paul Ellwood, the physician who persuaded the Nixon administration to take an interest in HMOs, believes they now have "a momentum of their own," and points to statistics that continue to indicate exponential rates of growth. (Nationally about five and a half million people are now enrolled.) But the figures may be deceptive. In the period ahead many fledgling HMOs may go under or never get off the ground, despairing of their chances of qualifying as an HMO under the federal requirements and falling short in their projected enrollments.

Public indifference to prepaid health plans doesn't really explain their problems. The established plans are almost all oversubscribed. A number of them, like the Group Health Association of Washington, DC, Kaiser-Permanente of Southern California, the Group Health Cooperative of Seattle, and the Harvard Community Health Plan, have at various times had to suspend enrollment of new subscriber groups, not because there was too little demand for their services, but because there was too much.

The immediate problems of the developing HMOs seem partly to have been created by the legislation Congress enacted in 1973—particularly a provision that, when eventually implemented, will require firms with employee health plans and 25 workers or more to offer a "qualifying" HMO as an alternative to health insurance. A long delay in issuing final regulations on dual choice, as it is called, has caused many employers to hold back from making any contracts with developing HMOs because of uncertainty as to which HMOs, if any, will qualify under the law.

As of now it seems that few will. The act requires qualifying HMOs to provide not only physicians' services, hospitalization, emergency care and diagnostic and laboratory services, but also home health services, mental health care (up to 20 visits), alcoholism and drug addiction services, family planning and preventive dental care for children. Most established plans don't provide all these services, and certainly couldn't have afforded them in their early years. The federal requirements complicate start-up financing, inflate the premiums HMOs must charge and consequently make them less attractive to consumers, particularly in a recession. It seems never to have been considered that many consumers might not want all this coverage, either because they can't afford it or wish to make arrangements for part of it elsewhere. But under the act the HMO has no choice: it must provide all of the mandated basic services to all of its subscribers whether they like it or not. Unlike most insurance companies and Blue Cross, it cannot offer a lower benefit package.

Yet this is not all. The legislation also requires HMOs to allow open enrollment by individuals for 30 days at least once a year and to provide services at a single "community" rate regardless of the health of those who apply. These requirements, like the wide scope of basic services, are certainly desirable, and most plans do offer "community rating" to their subscribers. However, many observers believe that to mandate both individual open enrollment and "community rating" for HMOs, but not their competitors, is to place them at a severe disadvantage. The insurance companies, which use "experience rating" (*i.e.*, higher rates for higher risk people), can simply leave the chronically ill and disabled to the HMOs, which will be legally obligated to provide them coverage at ordinary rates.

The HMO legislation originally introduced by Sen. Kennedy recognized the added costs created by the high benefit package, open enrollment, community rating and other requirements. Consequently it would

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have provided subsidies for them. But when the legislation finally emerged from Congress, the requirements were still there and the subsidies were gone.

"Impossible in good times, disastrous in bad times" is the way one HEW official describes the law. Like others in the agency, he is as convinced of the viability of the health maintenance idea as he is of the impracticability of the legislation. The HMO Act has been widely hailed as a major social experiment, but it is an experiment designed to fail.

It is still conceivable that a determined and flexible administration could carry out the program with moderate success. There are a few loopholes in the law that could be creatively exploited. Major amendments could be asked of Congress, and some undoubtedly will. But according to people at HEW, the HMO program has not had a strong advocate high in the agency since the departure of Elliot Richardson. The whole field of health policy, moreover, is now in severe disarray. In recent weeks there have been resignations from the Assistant Secretary of Health, the director of the Health Services Administration and the director of the National Institutes of Health. The HMO program itself is thinly staffed, and there is no capacity, either within the government or outside, for the active provision of technical assistance to help new HMOs get started. This is a critical flaw in the program.

Congress has written a script which, if left unchanged, has a virtually assured dénouement. When the drama is played out and the venture fails, those who opposed the HMO idea from the beginning will be able to say that it has had its chance. Ironically the unfulfilled expectations created by the HMO Act and the fanfare that accompanied it may do as much damage to prepaid health care in the future as the AMA did in the past. Moreover since the fee-for-service, cost-plus system will probably be no more capable of controlling expenses under future health insurance programs than it has under Medicare and Medicaid, we can all expect to pay for this failure in the end.

Is Capital Punishment Back to Stay?

Give 'em Death?

by Michael Roberts

The quality of vengeance is not strained, judging by the swift, resolute responses of three-fifths of the state legislatures to the Supreme Court's last capital punishment ruling. In the case of *Furman* vs. *Georgia* in 1972 the court overturned the death sentences of three black men (one convicted of murder, the others of rape) on the theory that their execution would violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. A major factor was discretionary sentencing—the court chose not to uphold a system under which society could selectively eliminate its most despised elements and spare the rest. Faced, thus, with an all-or-nothing choice, at least 30 states so far have opted for statutes making execution mandatory upon conviction of certain crimes.

North Carolina moved with particular dispatch into its version of conformity with the law. Early in 1973 the state supreme court struck down jury discretion in capital cases. Then the legislature made the death penalty mandatory for first-degree murder. Subsequently some 70 convicts (the nationwide total is about 200) have been stockpiled on North Carolina's death row. Among the condemned is Jesse Fowler, 26, a former furniture store truck driver in Raleigh. On July 1, 1973 Fowler and John Griffin—his friend and former roommate—argued over a $10 bill during a crap game. The bickering resumed at a bar, where Griffin punched Fowler, breaking his nose. Later in the day Fowler went to Griffin's home and, after more angry words, shot him to death with a pistol. Tried and convicted for first-degree murder (the jury's options included conviction on a lesser offense), Fowler could receive only one sentence under the court-modified statute: death in the gas chamber.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected Fowler's argument that his execution would be cruel and unusual, but the US Supreme Court agreed to hear his appeal (oral arguments are scheduled later this month). Why this case was chosen—from among eight challenges to the death penalty's constitutionality—is

Michael Roberts is a Washington newspaperman.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

subject to question.

"It's a one-issue case," says David Kendall of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, which represents Fowler. "The others all had more." That one issue is the constitutionality of ending Jesse Fowler's life. Diversionary elements are notably absent. There were no racial implications in the trial itself, since both victim and perpetrator were black. What's doubtful is whether the nature of this crime lends itself to the ultimate decision on death as a criminal sanction. There is agreement on all sides, in fact, that Fowler's act was among the least heinous of the potential test cases. The prosecutor who tried the case told *The Washington Star* the killing was "an alcohol thing more than anything; Fowler had been drinking all day. I realized it wasn't the worst kind of murder case." If the Supreme Court were of a mind to rule out executions unequivocally, it could certainly make its point more graphically in the case of the convict most—not least—deserving of harsh justice.

Nonetheless the United States, in its Justice Department incarnation, seems terrified of the possibility that this is the crossroads and that the court may turn the wrong way. Solicitor General Robert H. Bork has entered the case as a friend of the court and an enemy of mercy. "The United States believes," the introduction to the *amicus curiae* brief states, that imposition of the death penalty may sometimes be a necessary and appropriate measure to achieve the traditional goals of criminal justice."

To demonstrate why some people need to be executed, the United States resorts to anachronistic reasoning. "Their brief was written as if *Furman* wasn't even decided," one expert on the subject says. Technically that is incorrect. The Bork brief acknowledges *Furman* long enough to say that the positions taken by the justices (the case was decided 5-4) will not be discussed. Rather to be addressed is "the propriety of this Court's exercise of power to nullify the considered judgment of 31 states, and of Congress, that capital punishment is a legitimate response to certain crimes." Uppermost in the United States' argument is that the court ought not to presume to substitute its judgment for that of the people and their state lawmakers, since "it is utterly implausible that so many legislatures can . . . fail to reflect the will of the people concerning capital punishment."

The court could follow this line most anywhere. If most people demonstrably want segregation, give them segregation. But, as Morris Dees of the Southern Poverty Law Center observes, "The constitution wasn't designed to protect the majority." Other death penalty opponents maintain also that while a populace frightened by crime may support capital punishment in the abstract, juries are usually extremely reluctant to make actual use of it.

As for the social utility of executions, the United States views them as opportunities for the society to express its outrage at a particular crime, as a form of "retribution, perhaps, but without vindictiveness." According to a quoted authority, "Without a sense of retribution we may lose our sense of wrong . . . a community which is too ready to forgive the wrongdoer may end by condoning the crime."

As if anyone contests the proposition that it would be soul-satisfying, in a collective way, to see a Mafia hit man get his just desserts? Sad to say society gets all too few chances to shout its mass "Take that!" Execution has typically been the fate not of the notorious, but the impoverished nonentity whose offense is scarcely remembered, much less with revulsion, by the time sentence is carried out.

Ultimately, of course, everything comes down to the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, upon which Fowler is appealing. The United States traced the "cruel and unusual" clause to its historical roots: the English Bill of Rights of 1689. The clause is characterized as Parliament's defense against the arbitrary power of the king's magistrates to invent new and horrible punishments. Hence the accepted methods of execution at the time—drawing and quartering, and burning alive—were not thought to fall within the meaning of the clause. Likewise, according to the Bork brief, the adoption of the crucial words into the Constitution was a precaution against tortures a tyrannous Congress might dream up, "But nothing supports the inference that the framers thought that capital punishment would be prohibited."

For that matter nothing supports the inference that the framers thought that black people would be regarded as human beings. What is most incomprehensible about this effort to preserve the death penalty is the unwillingness of the United States to acknowledge that the Supreme Court has long since taken it upon itself to make up for the framers' inability to foresee changes. As a matter of fact it has already done so specifically with regard to the words "cruel and unusual," a circumstance that accounts for Bork's pretense that *Furman* is nonexistent.

The majority in *Furman* said a punishment could be cruel and unusual if society would apply it only to its most unpopular elements, but wouldn't countenance it as a general sanction; if lesser means of punishment might serve the same ends; if it were invoked so infrequently that there was no meaningful basis for its use in a given instance—that it became freakish in application. Justice Stewart said the death penalty was different from other punishments "not in degree but in kind," both because of its irrevocability and its "absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity." Justice Brennan said, "The true significance of these [capital] punishments is that they treat members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded. They are thus inconsistent with the fundamental premise of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

clause that even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common human dignity." Justice Douglas said, "In Hindu law a Brahman was exempt from capital punishment, and in those days, generally, in the law books, punishment increased in severity as social status diminished. We have, I fear, taken in practice the same position, partially as a result of making the death penalty discretionary and partially as a result of the ability of the rich to purchase the services of the most respected and most resourceful legal talent in the Nation."

This time around the court will have to decide whether anything has changed now that the specific penalty-fixing discretion has been removed. Other forms of discretion remain. Prosecutors still decide which charge to bring, if any. Grand juries decide whether to indict. Judges decide how to charge juries. Juries choose between convicting for greater or lesser offenses. Morris Dees says discretion still works in the same old ways: "In North Carolina, blacks are still getting the death penalty two-to-one over whites . . . You say, well, do blacks commit two times more capital offenses than whites? According to the justice department's annual report on crime, whites commit 30 percent more rapes, murders and armed robberies. Blacks are about 23 percent of the North Carolina population, yet about 65 percent of those on death row are black. Just to show the discriminatory application, since 1910 North Carolina has executed 285 blacks, which is 78.7 percent of the total, and 72 whites, 20 percent. And the most the blacks ever were was 32 percent of the population. Since 1950 15 blacks have been executed and five whites."

David Kendall adds, "Our point really is that people arbitrarily are convicted of first-degree murder in North Carolina. We're not arguing that you can ever eliminate every bit of discretion from the criminal system, but you can do much more toward controlling the arbitrariness."

Certainly the Supreme Court would not have to come very far from *Furman* to eliminate the areas of arbitrariness still associated with the death penalty. Justice Douglas' return to activity makes another 5-4 decision possible in Jesse Fowler's appeal. Morris Dees foresees the possibility of a very narrow ruling, merely overturning the judicial statute-modification under which Fowler received his automatic death sentence. "But," Dees says, "they may surprise us all."

Why Did the Shah Switch Sides?

Selling Out the Kurds

by Jon Kimche

The Shah of Iran concluded the Pact of Algiers with the de facto ruler of Iraq, Sadam Husain Tikriti, on March 6. Following his return from Algiers, the Shah summoned the Kurdish leader, Mustafa Barzani, to Tehran and told him that Iran was withdrawing all aid to the Kurdish resistance, recalling all arms and supplies, and he ordered Barzani to halt all military operations against the Iraqis.

The Shah used the same argument with which the British and French had justified the abandonment of Czechoslovakia at Munich in 1938, and with which Stalin had validated his agreement with Hitler in 1939. As the Shah put it to Barzani, "the Pact of Algiers was vital to Iranian interests." If the Kurds did not see it that way then they might have to face not only the massed strength of the Iraqi armed forces without any Iranian aid, but also the possible direct military intervention against them by their former Iranian ally.

On March 18 Gen. Barzani gave the order to the Kurdish resistance—the *pesh merga*—that the Shah had demanded, to abandon the struggle that had, for the first time, brought them within shooting distance of success. Munich and the Nazi-Soviet pact brought about the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia and Poland and led directly to World War II. Are we then not rather overplaying the parallel with this obscure war in the remote mountains of western Asia?

The consequences for the world at large may not be as cataclysmic as were those of 1938 and 1939, but the political implications are no less serious—and for the people of Kurdistan every bit as grave as they were for

Jon Kimche is editor of the London fortnightly *Afro-Asian Affairs.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Czechs and Poles. But by far the most significant feature of the Algiers agreement was that for the first time the problem of Kurdistan and the Kurdish future has been internationalized formally as a central element in the relationship of the two most powerful countries in the Persian Gulf area where two-thirds of the world's oil reserves are located.

This may well be the crux of the Kurdish problem—and one of the main reasons why it may not lie down after the Pact of Algiers in the way the Shah and the Iraqis would like. The Kurds, after all, are one of the most genuine ancient nations on earth, with a recorded history going back some 4000 years to the Sumerians in 2000 BC. Since then they have occupied the historic and strategic triangle that after World War I was divided between Turkey, Persia, Syria and Iraq. The area thus partitioned was about 150,000 square miles and is inhabited today by an estimated eight to 10 million Kurds, though Kurdish nationalists claim almost double that figure. The generally accepted estimates place three million Kurds in Turkey (where they are allowed no national identification and are known officially only as "Mountain Turks"), three million in Iran, two million in Iraq, 300,000 in Syria and 100,000 in the Soviet Union. About a million live outside Kurdistan, mainly in Baghdad, Damascus, Aleppo, Basra and Tehran.

After World War I the Kurdish people had been promised the right of self-determination by the victorious allies, as were the Jews and the Arab successor nations to the Ottoman Empire. But their future became mixed up with the imperial requirements of the great powers and especially with the allocation of the Mosul oilfields in northern Iraq.

Their attempt to rescue a measure of autonomy was severely repressed in Turkey in 1925 and again, with even harsher measures, in 1930 and 1937; their attempt to establish a Kurdish republic in Iran was put down in 1946; but it was in Iraq that the Kurds made their most persistent and successful attempts since 1961 to safeguard their autonomous future inside an Iraqi state. They had witnessed—and to some extent participated in—the liquidation by the Iraqi central government of other autonomous minorities whose future had been guaranteed by the Iraqi government and underwritten by the great powers—not least that of Christian Assyrians who were the neighbors of the Kurds in northern Iraq.

They had seen enough not to trust their own fate to the authorities in Baghdad without retaining their own armed forces as reinsurance. And this was the basic bone of contention between the Kurds and the Iraqi government since the latest series of conflicts began in 1961. In March 1970 the Kurds accepted a government offer of far-reaching autonomy, but the government failed to implement its proposals and the Kurds resumed military operations in March 1974.

As the Iraqi government grew in unpopularity at home and was increasingly feared by its neighbors, especially by Iran and Syria, both because of its adventurist foreign policy and its growing links with the Soviet Union, the Kurdish factor assumed more than purely local Iraqi significance. The Kurds suddenly discovered that they had friends in relatively influential places. And nowhere more so than in Tehran. By the late summer of 1974, the Shah had virtually adopted the Kurdish war and collaborated fully not only with the Kurdish resistance forces but also with their allies. The Iranians not only supplied artillery, anti-aircraft guns and ammunition, they also facilitated American and Israeli aid for the Kurds to reach its destination across Iranian territory. Increasingly in the summer and winter of 1974 and into the early months of 1975, the Iranians treated the Kurdish war as part of their own struggle against Iraq, and the Iraqis responded in kind toward Iran and toward Iranian citizens living in Iraq. Some 10,000 were summarily deported, a number were arrested and a few of their leaders were demonstratively tried and hanged.

The Shah's position in this phase of the war was described at the time by David Hirst, one of the best-informed English Arabists in a dispatch to the London *Guardian* (October 15, 1974). The reason for the Shah's seemingly far-flung diplomacy, he says, was principally concern for Iran's frontiers and security, "that Soviet encirclement he so deeply fears." In befriending Egypt—and other Arab countries like Syria and the Sudan—the Shah hoped "to isolate and weaken his immediate neighbor, Iraq, whom he sees as the Soviet Trojan horse in the West."

In this, Hirst reported last October, the Shah had been remarkably successful. There had been virtually no Arab protests "about his unprecedented support for the Kurdish rebellion" against their fellow member of the Arab League. "Iranian influence in the Kurdish north has reached such a point that, whatever the outcome of the fighting, the central government in Baghdad will probably never be able to eliminate it."

This was no passing change of fortune. Six months later, only days before the Shah concluded the Pact of Algiers with the Iraqis on March 6, 1975, Romain La Bourgarie, a special correspondent of the very reliable Swiss *Neue Zurcher Zeitung*, assessed the situation after many months spent in Kurdistan. The Iraqi military offensive had seemingly spent itself.

The Iraqis had concentrated 80,000 men with 800 Soviet tanks, with the hard-core of the TU-16 and SU-7 Soviet-supplied bombers to back them, assisted by eight squadrons of MIG-21s and 17s against the forces of the *pesh merga* along the Iraqi-Iranian frontier. The campaign, which had then lasted just about a year, had been a disaster for the Iraqis. La Bourgarie, who was the representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross, estimated that in these 12 months the Iraqis had suffered at least 7000 dead and 10,000

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wounded. Other observers considered these to be somewhat conservative estimates. Even so, this meant that 80 percent of Iraq's armed forces were tied down on the Kurdish front and that their losses amounted to close on 20 percent of their establishment.

It was this aspect that particularly pleased a rather mixed bag of interested parties. For the Shah it meant a weakening of the Iraqi threat on his borders and of the implied Soviet influence there. For the Syrians it meant a lessening of the considerable Iraqi pressure on Syria's internal politics. For the Kuwaitis it meant Iraqi preoccupation in the north, with less opportunity for pursuing the irridentist claims against the Kuwaiti territory claimed by Iraq. For the Israelis it meant less potential Iraqi influence and support on the "confrontation line" with Israel, and less military ability to support either Syria or Jordan in case of a conflict. For the Americans it meant an embarrassment for the Russians and a weakening of the hard-line influence of the Iraqis on Arab-Israeli negotiations.

Both Hirst in October 1974 and La Bourgarie in March 1975 concluded from their observation that the continuing success of the Kurds, which seemed probable with the backing they were receiving from Tehran, the fall of the Sadam Husain Baathist rule in Baghdad was assured, and with it the considerable weakening of the Soviet position in this critical region.

Then, suddenly, on March 6, 1975 it was all over. The Shah and Sadam Husain rounded off the OPEC oil summit in Algiers with a pact resolving all Iranian-Iraqi differences. The public clauses indicated that the Iraqis had made considerable territorial concessions in the Shatt-al-Arab area at the mouth of the Persian Gulf; in return the Shah undertook to withdraw all aid from the Kurds and to halt the Kurdish resistance to Iraqi rule. This he did at once.

The Turkish government said some 150,000 Kurds sought refuge in the Kurdish areas in Turkey but they were driven back. The Iranian authorities said that some 90,000 Kurds had sought refuge in Iran and were allowed to enter. But by all accounts these are being treated more like prisoners of war than as refugees free to make their own way. Reports from Tehran and Baghdad—and almost all reports about the Kurds now come from either of these two sources—say that Barzani and his fellow leaders have entered Iran and given up the fight, and that thousands of Kurds are now returning home from Iran and welcoming the Iraqi troops as liberators.

All that one can say about these official Iranian and Iraqi reports is that they are suspect, that they have never been even remotely accurate about conditions in Kurdistan. Kurdish sources deny that the Barzanis have left the battle zone or that there is no resistance left. They admit that they are in dire difficulty but they deny that they have accepted the Shah's ultimatum to surrender unconditionally to the Iraqis on the lines of the so-called amnesty. This, the Kurds say, is so fenced round with conditional terms as to be politically and legally meaningless. (However most recent independent reports confirm that Barzani himself did accept the Shah's ultimatum and is now in Iran in custody incommunicado.)

They are also skeptical about the other provisions of the deal between Iraq and Iran. There are still many unresolved problems between the two countries that may create new difficulties, not least among them the position of the expelled Iranians.

But no matter, for the moment the Shah and Iraq are riding high and are moving ahead along their new course—but where is it intended to lead? The Kurds have suffered a defeat as a consequence of the betrayal at the hand of their most trusted ally, but they are still around: in Iraq, in Iran, in Syria and in Turkey. They are receiving some aid from Syria which is greatly worried by the new strength of Iraq.

For the moment, however, the Kurds are the victims of their ally and it is this that has introduced a new dimension into the Middle Eastern pattern. For the key lies with the unpublished aspect of the Iranian-Iraqi deal. In the early stages the Russians were claiming privately among Western diplomats that it had been arranged, in fact, with Soviet help. But closer inspection of the nature of the agreement cannot have left the Russians altogether happy.

After a hastily arranged visit to Baghdad on March 29, the Iranian Prime Minister, Abbas Hoveyda, and Sadam Husain, issued a communiqué in which they stressed that they were resolved "to expand cooperation to all fields of mutual interest" and they affirmed their joint intention "that this region be divorced from every kind of foreign interference." The same Soviet diplomats who only a week or two earlier had claimed credit for bringing about *rapprochement* between Iraq and Iran and had thoroughly approved of the fate of the "Kurdish fascist clique" were hastily reconstructing their scenario. Sadam Husain, who on past visits had received more courtesy and honors in Moscow than any Arab head of state, was requested to come to Moscow on April 14. The Russians were clearly anxious just what this new Iran-Iraqi axis had in mind.

They also wanted to find out just what were the Shah's intentions. On the Shah's last visit to Moscow, Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin had pointedly told the Shah that the Soviet Union would stand by Iraq if it was attacked by Iran. What the Russians and the Americans had not contemplated was that the Shah would switch sides and, together with Iraq, seek to establish a superpower-free region in the Persian Gulf area that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia might also join.

However to make sure that there will be no new hitch the signatories of the Pact of Algiers must really liquidate the Kurdish problem—and that may require more than a signature to one more infamous peace on paper.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Stanley Kauffmann on films

Antonioni

Fine artists make us feel proprietary of them. They invade us so strongly, become so much a part of the way we look outward and inward, that we can't approach new works of theirs without some sense that we are intimately involved. Whenever I go to see a new film by Michelangelo Antonioni, I feel nervous. I want it to be good because, in a way inconsequential to anyone but me, I am a partner. Five years ago I saw *Zabriskie Point* three times before I could deal with my disappointment. I've seen his new film, *The Passenger* (UA), twice. In several aspects it's good; but fundamentally it's even more disappointing than the last film.

The script comes from a story by Mark Peploe, brother of Clare Peploe, who collaborated on *Zabriskie Point*. Antonioni says that at first he was "somewhat taken aback" by the story, then decided "rather instinctively" to proceed. To dwell on that belated "instinct" would be sheerly speculative on my part, but obviously it's the core of the matter. A screenplay was then written by Peploe, Antonioni and Peter Wollen, who is English (like Peploe) and the author of *Signs and Meaning in the Cinema*, a semiological study that has impressed some readers.

The story is based on a premise that no one would claim is original: a man changes identity and tries to live a new life. (Previous examples: Tolstoy's play *The Living Corpse*, Pirandello's novel *The Late Mattia Pascal*. The passenger is a British TV correspondent played by Jack Nicholson, whose accent is (feebly) explained by the fact that he was educated in the US. On assignment in a north African country, he meets an English businessman in a small hotel on the edge of the desert. Nicholson wants to interview some insurgents out in the desert, fails to make contact, and returns to the hotel to find that the businessman, named David Robertson, is dead in his room of a heart attack. Nicholson switches the photographs in the two passports, takes the man's diaries and plane tickets, convinces the befuddled hotel manager that there has been no switch, and takes off.

After a brief secret visit to London, he proceeds to Munich, according to Robertson's diary of appointments, and finds himself involved in gun-running. Robertson had been purchasing guns for those rebels in Africa and was personally unknown to the Munich agents. Nicholson is given a large amount of money, then takes off for his next diary appointment in Barcelona. There he catches sight of his former TV producer, Ian Hendry, who has come to track down Robertson in order to learn more of what happened to the supposedly dead correspondent. In fleeing Hendry, Nicholson hooks up with a footloose architecture student, Maria Schneider (of *Last Tango in Paris*) whom he had passingly glimpsed in London.

His putative widow (he also has an adopted child whom we never see) receives her "dead" husband's effects, sees the strange photo in the passport, learns the real dead man's profession, and pursues Nicholson herself, to warn him that, in her new role, he is in danger. Nicholson, not knowing her motive, flees with Schneider, in order to preserve his new life. He thinks he's escaping wife or police but it's the agents of that African government who really want him. In the last sequence of about four minutes, which is the film's most notable achievement, Nicholson is found in a small hotel in a Spanish town, and is killed.

The narrative is usable and could make either a neat ironical thriller in the Ambler-Greene vein or a more complex work in Pirandello country. It was aimed at the latter, but it lands in the former. Chiefly the fault is the character of the protagonist, as played and as written. Nicholson moves through it all sincerely enough but with no energy of crisis. When he decides to switch lives, it comes as a surprise because, although we couldn't know much factually about him at this early point, he has no kind of weight to suggest such a possibility. The numerous flashbacks—which are handled marvelously—do not give him the substance of past to make up for this lack. We learn that he knew his reporting was superficial and dishonest, only one type of TV entertainment, but Nicholson supplies no flavor of repressed disgust. (Richard Burton was the man for the part.) It comes out just a character sufficiently motivated for an above-average thriller.

The script doesn't give Nicholson much help. The dialogue throughout misses every opportunity for distinction, whether in brief exchanges or in an obvious set-piece about a blind man that Nicholson delivers on what turns out to be his death-bed. Language is really a key trouble with the film: there are gorgeous pictures and large motions, which are constantly dragged down by banal language. Antonioni may not know English well enough to know when banality is being imposed on him. Let's just say that he had better luck with Edward Bond as the scriptwriter of *Blow-Up*.

Even the attempt to center on the idea of engagement—by assuming the dead man's identity, Nicholson assumes his commitment (through the diary) and must plunge on—becomes a mere addition to script décor. For this film to be successful as presumably Antonioni wished, we would have to feel that it was all taking place, really, *within* the protagonist. Instead we are on the outside watching the protagonist move through a story.

In addition there is fuzziness in the structure. The opening sequence, Nicholson trying to reach the rebels, is intended to symbolize frustrated quest, I suppose, but it's too long and detailed for its importance. Immediately after switching identities, Nicholson goes to London, to his own house. Why? Luckily no one was home and no neighbor saw him, or the film would have been over.

(*continued on page 33*)

Films Worth Seeing

A Brief Vacation. De Sica directs Florinda Bolkan superbly in this tale of a young working woman's self realization. Mushy but moving.

Donkey Skin. Catherine Deneuve in a French musical fairy tale. It all floats by very pleasantly.

Hearts and Minds. A Vietnam documentary. Politically unclear, still with grim power.

The Love of Life. Documentary of Arthur Rubinstein. Eighty-eight terrific years.

Scenes from a Marriage. Bergman compressed his 300-minute Swedish TV series into three hours. But it's Bergman. And Liv Ullmann.

SK

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Who's Managing the World?

Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporations by Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Müller

Simon & Schuster; $11.95)

n tomorrow's world, will we be speaking Exxonese rather than English? Is the corporate octopus going to embrace the whole planet?

General Motors already is bigger than a combination of Switzerland, Pakistan and South Africa if size is defined in terms of annual sales and production figures. Royal Dutch Shell, on the same basis, is bigger than Iran, Venezuela and Turkey. These examples, cited in *Global Reach*, are neither isolated nor exceptional. Many business corporations can be compared in size to whole countries, because multinational corporations, operating on a global scale, have become so big; and because nations have become so small with the breakup of colonial empires. The contrast between giant companies and pygmy countries can be startling when viewed in money terms. In the spring of 1973, *The Wall Street Journal* reported that if a corporation's sales were to be equated with a nation's output of goods and services, 51 of the world's 100 biggest money-powers would be international corporations and only 49 would be countries. Recently, therefore, books and articles have routinely described multinational corporations as being in some ways much like national states.

Richard Barnet and Ronald Müller reject that analogy on the grounds that the nation-state has a limited scope. They say that global corporations now overshadow the nations of the world, and may be in process of superseding them. The bold and original thesis of *Global Reach* is that the oligarchy of global corporations has developed a system that is in the nature of world government: "The global corporation is the first institution in human history dedicated to centralized planning on a world scale"; and "The men who run the global corporations are the first in history with the organization, technology, money and ideology to make a credible try at managing the world as an integrated unit."

Barnet and Müller show that they are aware of how great a claim they're staking out on behalf of their subject. They look back more than 2000 years, to the Macedonian conqueror who declared that all men are the sons of one Father and whose avowed political program was to unify the world; and they say that where Alexander failed, the manufacturers of consumer products are succeeding.

Does anything stand in the way of the corporate takeover bid? Yes, say the authors: the obsolete nation-state, supported by irrational nationalism. Companies and countries are going to fight it out at Armageddon: "The confrontation between the multinational corporation and its enemies promises to influence the shape of human society in the last third of the century more than any other political drama of our time." In such a battle, what is it that the companies have going for them? The desire of the world's people is for consumer products. Businessmen, not politicians, are satisfying it. Does that mean that the corporations will conquer the nations? Yes; tomorrow the nation-state "will in any meaningful sense be dead."

The evidence to support these claims consists of quotations from business executives which are taken at face value. The rest of the book is then devoted to an analysis of the negative effect that global corporations are having on a comprehensive range of world needs and aspirations. In my view, the companies aren't given enough credit for their positive achievements in such areas as the boosting of food production. The authors conclude that the global corporations are a world government that isn't serving the public interest.

Barnet and Müller find that corporations exist to serve their own interests rather than those of the community at large. That should have been a foregone conclusion, pertaining to the very nature of the corporate entity and to the laws by which it is governed. The directors of a corporation are trustees for its shareholders. They're not entitled to disregard the interests of those to whom the law has made them responsible. They can give away their own money but not somebody else's. Of course they can administer their stockholders' affairs in an enlightened way for the public good. They can take public-spirited or charitable actions for public relations purposes, but such actions can be undertaken only if they can be justified in terms of the private interest of the shareholders as a group. If an individual shareholder submits a proposal that he wishes to have considered at a corporation's annual meeting, and the proposal relates to a general economic, political, racial, religious or social cause, the current rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission authorize corporate management to go so far as to exclude such a proposal from its proxy material if it concerns a matter not sufficiently related to the business of the corporation, which is to make money. The job of corporate officers and directors is to accomplish that objective. If they managed the affairs of their corporations for the benefit of the world rather than for the benefit of their shareholders, they would quite rightly be subject to lawsuit.

The executives quoted in *Global Reach* aren't saying that they've abandoned the pursuit of their stockholders' private interests. What they're saying is that such a pursuit is all that the community needs. Barnet and Müller write: "The global corporation and the world economy it is working to build are the modern embodiment of Adam Smith's invisible hand. The most reliable instruments of social progress are . . . all based on nothing more 'political' than healthy human acquisitiveness." Quite rightly Barnet and Müller identify this as the 18th-century view that the community's needs will take care of themselves if everybody pursues his own rationally conceived self-interest. In this view only private interests require management. Government is unnecessary. In fact it's harmful, for it interferes with the way in which things would have worked out by themselves. The managers of the global corporations are saying that a world government should not be created. But this is quite the reverse of the proposition that Barnet and Müller understood them to be asserting. The heads of the multinational corporations are not making "a credible try at managing the world," and they would be violently opposed to anybody else who tried to do so. In their view it's something that shouldn't be done. They believe that only private groups like their own should undertake planetary operations,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and they pride themselves on being the first organizations in history to do so.

Of course they're wrong about that. Other types of organizations similarly have undertaken global activities for some time past. There are worldwide religious organizations like the Roman Catholic Church, worldwide military organizations: Gen. George Marshall, as chief of staff of the US army during World War II, planned and coordinated operations on a global scale. There are also benevolent, fraternal and educational organizations that are worldwide in scope, of which one of the best known is the Boy Scout movement. To a varying extent all of these organizations have shared some awareness of the consequences of their actions in the real world. The danger posed by global business corporations is that they seem to have no such awareness, if the quotations in *Global Reach* represent a fair sampling of their views.

What are the consequences of the activities of the global corporations? They have been helping to create the beginnings of an international economy. To deal with the relevant aspects of this development requires either increased cooperation between national governments, if that's possible, or else, as Pope John XXIII proposed, the creation of a wider political authority to supersede the national state either in whole or in part. The greater the scale of economic activity, the greater can be its impact in terms of either benefit or harm, and the more important it is for a public authority of some sort to protect the public from the potential harm. Thus the global corporations are helping to make government regulation more necessary than ever before, while at the same time denying the need for government of either a national or global character. In fact they are opposed not merely to government but also to politics and the things with which it is concerned. The business managers whom they interviewed, write Barnet and Müller, have a "conviction that they have a historic mandate to create a postpolitical world order." They can integrate the world, they say, but only if "governments leave them alone."

The businessmen's justification for claiming a right to make the ultimate decisions in matters affecting the whole world, according to Barnet and Müller, is "superior management skill." But if efficiency were the sole criterion for leadership, we should have voted for Adolf Eichmann while we still had the chance. One of the major differences between the conduct of public affairs and the conduct of corporate affairs is precisely that politics calls for qualities that are far more important than mere efficiency. In politics you have to make choices about ends as well as means. The test of a leader is in large part his choice of his goals and beliefs. A business executive, on the other hand, doesn't do this; his objective, the making of money for his company, has been chosen for him in advance, and he has no experience in dealing with the range of questions that are raised by a fundamental examination of objectives. Those who enter public life with nothing more than management skills are equipped to be at best subordinates and at worst failures. Winston Churchill's erratic genius made for pandemonium; the truly superb administrator was Neville Chamberlain, who is said to have made greater improvements in local government structures and procedures in Great Britain than any other person in the 20th century. Herbert Hoover was a good businessman and Franklin Roosevelt was a poor one.

Typically the business leaders quoted in *Global Reach* don't even accept the validity of the issues with which politics deals. They say that the only thing that people want in order to be happy is to have enough money to buy an abundance of consumer goods—not recognizing that mankind has other hungers as well. Moreover even where the achievement of prosperity is concerned, they take the anti-political line that it doesn't or shouldn't come about through governmental planning. In their view if they make their companies rich, they'll make everybody else rich in the process. Two-thirds of *Global Reach* is devoted to proving them wrong about this.

Barnet and Müller should have been able to conclude that the satisfaction of the world's needs requires something more than the mere pursuit of private interests and that the world's economy therefore requires regulation and planning by public authorities. But they can't do so, because they've saddled themselves with the thesis that a world government already exists, in the form of a consortium of global corporations. They can't say that the world's economy needs a government because they've said that we already *have* such a government. They claim that the corporations are managing global affairs, even though their evidence shows that the corporations are merely managing their own affairs on a global scale—and the authors fail to perceive the distinction between those two statements. They muddle the issue by using the same language to describe both situations: General Tire's management of its own affairs in the world, and General Tire's alleged management of the world's affairs in the world. The first process is in fact taking place and the second is not. But Barnet and Müller can't say so because they haven't seen the difference between the two concepts.

The falseness of their confused and confusing central thesis that corporate managers are "in process of managing the world as an integrated system" in turn invalidates much of the rest of their discussion and gives it a dizzy, out-of-focus sort of feeling. *Nobody* is managing the world as an integrated system, and that's the problem, not merely with the emerging world economy, but also with the threat of nuclear war, the continuing damage to the world environment, and all sorts of planetary dislocations. Somebody is managing companies like GM and ITT but nobody is managing the globe.

Yet it seems to me, as to many others, that management is badly needed, for in the modern world power is dangerously out of control, particularly the multinational corporation's ability to disrupt orderly trading in international currencies, a shadowy area of activity where little is known with any certainty. Even the estimated figures are in dispute, though more should be learned about them soon as a result of recently adopted

The Sharing of Land and Resources In America

Peter Barnes' six-part series on the distribution of land and wealth in America is now available as a 64-page booklet. Price [including postage and handling]:

1-10 — $2 per copy
11-50 — $1.50
over 50 — $1

Address orders to
THE NEW REPUBLIC
1244 19th St., NW
Washington, DC 20036
prepaid orders only
D. C. residents add 5% tax

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JS Treasury regulations that force big ompanies to disclose their worldwide urrency positions on a monthly or uarterly basis. A few years back an official study estimated that the curren-y reserves of the global corporations nay be twice as large as the currency eserves of the world's governments. If hat turns out to be even near to the ruth, then methods must be devised to revent corporations from engaging in nassive currency transfers that might hatter the framework of the world's economy.

Thus the vast accumulation of wealth by multinational corporations repre-ents an out-of-control power. Yet at he same time it's also a source of veakness, at least in the political sphere, or their vast wealth exposes the orporations to envy and hatred. It's a veakness that invites exploitation. Once the companies commit themselves to fixed investments that can't be moved, they have given hostages to the countries in which those assets are located. Not merely nationalization, but also confiscatory taxes and burdensome regulations have tortured many busi-ness enterprises with something akin to the death of a thousand cuts. Wealth presents a temptation to local rulers who want to take it for themselves. Money is therefore an equivocal power, creating at the same time both strength and vulnerability.

The chief vulnerability of the global companies, though, is not abroad: it's at home. Barnet and Müller tell us that most global corporations are American, are owned almost entirely by American shareholders, and are managed at the top level almost exclusively by Ameri-cans. Though Barnet and Müller don't see it, these companies are therefore our prisoners if we choose to make them so. If we were the nationalizing sort, we could take them over with the stroke of a pen, and their alleged world empires would become a subsection of the US government. Of course we're not about to do that. But we might consider legislation that requires further disclo-sure of their activities and that regulates them wherever necessary. Contrary to what the authors of *Global Reach* tell us about how the multinationals are be-coming companies without a country, the key to the problem posed by most of the multinational corporations is their American nationality, which gives us the power to control them.

Not even the quoted executives seem to realize that the multinationals are on weak ground if it comes to a political contest against public authorities. It's typical, for these seem to be business-men who are totally oblivious to the perils of the 20th century. They seem to feel that their money makes them secure in a world where passions run riot, where terrorists with stolen atom bombs can blow up the city and govern-ments can blow up the world. Blandly the businessmen assert that their multi-national corporations will take over the management of Russia and China, as though Lenin and Trotsky had never arrived at the Finland Station and as though Mao and Chou had never made the long march to Shensi province. Traveling in their corporate jets high above the clouds, they have lost sight of the world below in which we live, and in which they, too, will have to live once they land.

David Fromkin

David Fromkin is a New York lawyer specializing in international finance. His book, *The Question of Government*, was published in February (Scribner's).

Thinking about Biography

by Peter Stansky

As a part-time biographer I often wonder about biography as a discipline. I am content, however, to proceed in the traditions of English empiricism, writing the biography in hand and not worrying too much about theory. I have a notion about what biography is, or should be, and do my best to conform to it—which is not to say that when the book is done, it bears an iron-clad resemblance to the idea of it I had in mind before I started writing.

But this year, as a judge in the biography category of the National Book Awards, I have been wondering serious-ly about the nature of biography—of autobiography too, as such books are also eligible for the award. This has come about as a defense against the cascade of books I have received over the past months. I have been desperately trying to sample and examine, read and digest, hoping I have not been swayed by reputation, or the attractiveness of a subject, or the fame of certain books that arrive loaded down with praise.

I should note some conspicious trends in biographical subjects this year. The outpouring of Bicentennially inspired lives: it is not so surprising that authors and publishers should be keenly aware of the approaching event, and they can only pray that the public—particularly now that the government no longer shows its previous generosity in sup-porting library purchases—will share their interest in figures out of our historic past. One of the most distin-guished such books is the story of an American loyalist, *Thomas Hutchinson*, by Bernard Bailyn. But most of the Bicentennial biographies are of figures on the winning side of the revolution, two of Thomas Paine, two of Jefferson, one speculating at length on his love life. Biographies of John Marshall, of Patrick Henry, of George Washington. Going back a bit in time—two of William Penn. And biographers go forward also: a fat celebration of Henry Kissinger. The inevitable presidential lives: not only, as mentioned, Washington and Jefferson, but also a vast Eisenhower; Truman in his own words as taped by an interviewer—one does wonder, by the way, who is the author of such a book, the subject, or the man with the recording apparatus?

We have a biography of our Pres-ident-by-appointment, Gerald Ford, by his former press secretary, who re-signed from the job immediately after his boss pardoned *his* former boss and benefactor Richard Nixon. Speaking of Nixon, the question of bias in biography is peculiarly apt. It is hard to imagine an unbiased biography of our only Presi-dent to resign from office under the threat of impeachment, to believe that a biography of Nixon that did not show him in an unfavorable light could be an accurate, that is, an unbiased one.

My own belief is that a biographer should aim for a combination of truth,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dispassion and sympathy—a combination that is not, I would argue, unattainable. When it is attained, one passes from bias to point of view, without which a biography, unless it is printed out by a computer, can hardly be said to exist. Let me admit candidly that I would find it very hard to write a biography of someone I totally disliked. This is not to say that one can't be critical of one's subject, or recognize faults, even as one puts the emphasis on virtues. And yet, obviously, biographies of villains are needed—from the Hitlers and Stalins down to the Neroes and Caligulas. I would just leave them to other authors, with different temperaments and principles. Such books, to the degree that they are *truthful*—and I am not thinking now of the ludicrous efforts to paint black white, and present, say, a delicious picture of the home life of the Stalins, or of Adolf Hitler, the misunderstood water-colorist and music-lover—must be exceptionally painful to write.

Even when they are truthful, I find muckraking biographies tedious to read unless they are done with great sophistication, subtlety, and above all a sense of proportion. I recently read one such work on an American philanthropist and businessman, and found its endless, one-note vilification had a contrary effect to the one intended. Surely he couldn't be as unmitigatedly wicked as the author maintains?

The biographer generally needs some degree of sympathy, some degree of identification with his subject, all the while attempting to maintain objectivity. For this reason, as I have suggested, it would seem to me peculiarly difficult to write a biography of an unsympathetic subject. True, if one were a stylish enough writer, one might have a delightful time and delight one's readers, doing in a hateful subject. But that is something else again, leaving one to consider the difference between a biographer and an entertainer.

Entertainers vary of course, but it's my observation that when they are not hating too much, they tend to be loving too much; and this is especially true when they are writing of figures from the world of entertainment. So I conclude from this year's meager crop. Such books assure that the readership likes stories and jokes. Some are very well told, and sometimes they are even funny. But the authors generally seem to feel that the telling of "jokes" and "inside stories" is enough. Their books tend to be shapeless, offering in a clip-clop superficial way the "life story." Biography or autobiography must be *shaped*. Otherwise the computer to which I have alluded might be set busily to work, fed a raw pile of data and offer us a depersonalized print-out, from birth to death, with all the "life" mysteriously absent.

Autobiography—whether by theatrical or literary or historical somebodies, or by mere nobodies—is, I suspect, even more difficult to write than biography. It is not that sympathy is wanting. In a typical autobiography there is a generous supply of *that* for the beloved object under scrutiny; but dispassion and objectivity are all too often in short supply. No man may be a hero to his valet, as they used to say, but he is, with pen in hand and mirror discreetly lighted, a hero to himself. Certainly we have had no masterwork of autobiography this year to compare, say, with Lillian Hellman's *Pentimento*, where an extraordinary intelligence and a sense of form are brilliantly united. On a less remarkable level, however, there have been a few deserving of comment—Mike Cherry's *High Steel*, for example, in which he writes informatively about becoming a construction worker. And there has been John R. Coleman's *Blue Collar Journal*, the diary of a year the president of Haverford College spent in menial jobs. His book has the dual fascination of biography and autobiography, as Coleman is playing a role himself—in some sense the biography uses the role-playing to come closer to the subject. Both books are, in their description of relationships, very touching, to a degree sentimental, and quite uninvolved with sex. Biographies continue to be more traditional—that is, reticent and fairly unexplicit—where sex is concerned. One can understanc why this should be so. For more recen lives, people who are still alive a witnesses or participants would inevita bly be involved in the story, and eithe wounded or tempted to bring libe charges. For older lives not enough i usually known—the incriminating doc uments have long since been consume by the flames—and biographers, espe cially serious ones, prefer not to specu late about such matters. (To be sure, ir recent years, biographies of members o Bloomsbury have made explicit the sexual quadrille of that group. But the English, thus far, seem to be blazing a trail of utter frankness. Americans, ir their biographies at least, still go in for a seemly reticence.)

Reticence, however, plays no part a all in chronicles of pain, suffering anc personal loss. Such books are a little hard to cope with, whether because o the author's bias or one's own. These books tend to be powerful, seemingly artless, and unimpeachable in their truthfulness. They appeal to the soap opera instinct in us all, and to our pleasure in voyeurism. They deal with death and disease—the husband dying of cancer, the son dying of leukemia—and are written by survivors. There is a certain fascination for the reader, but also distaste for the exposure. With their transparent sincerity and clinical exactitude these authors do "get at one," but does it reflect something larger, more free-floating and pervasive: that we are all believers, and disbelievers in death? There may be a certain correlation between the sense of malaise that many of us feel in and about American society and the marked increase in the number of books about death—in most cases *unfair* death. The death of children, as in Doris Lund's *Eric*, or the early death of a husband, as in Lynn Caine's powerfu *Widow*, or the death that is a blessed relief, as in Madeleine L'Engle's *Death o a Great Grandmother*. These books bring forth a compound of approval anc disapproval, fascination and fear. What is the value of sharing such experiences? The ancient exemplary purpose o biography is perhaps most vividly preserved in such lives and deaths—these are *examples*. But aren't our emotions—no doubt unintentionally—being playec with?

Twentieth-century biography was transformed by one of the most biased of writers, Lytton Strachey, who felt that the 19th-century monuments, those multivolumed, quasi-official biographies of the illustrious dead, were

Someday... research may conquer CEREBRAL PALSY.

Think about that the next time you're asked to

Give to UNITED CEREBRAL PALSY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

travesties of the truth. Full of indignation against the immediate English past—the past of his parents and grandparents—he was determined to cut it down to its proper size with his malicious but extremely witty and perceptive sketches. But even Lytton Strachey mellowed, became sympathetic as well as dispassionate, and wrote a generally affectionate biography of Queen Victoria, not to speak of an adulatory biography of Queen Elizabeth, with whom, in the oddest sort of way, he seems to have identified. But Strachey permanently disposed of biography as hagiography. The modern dominant approach to biography is a skeptical sympathy.

What is the experience of a biographer? Drawing upon my own adventures and difficulties, and what I would gather from that of the biographies of writers I have recently been reading, it tends to be a rather long drawn-out business, not to say ordeal. An attempt to master whatever there may be in print about the subject; and then an examination for sources, whether documents and manuscripts for those who are long dead, or documents and manuscripts and survivors for those of this century. As is probably true of any subject one writes about, it does seem to acquire a life of its own, demanding that more and more be done.

Interviewing provides a field day for bias on the part of the witness, who has his or her version of events to put forth. And then there are one's reactions to the witness, and to what degree that colors one's faith in what one is being told. One must be polite; yet it is necessary also to be somewhat skeptical, to allow for the changes that time has made in memory, and of course, the prejudices and point of view of the person to whom one is talking, as they are evident or surmised.

The most recent experience I've had with bias is in connection with the study that William Abrahams and I have done of the first 30 years in the life of George Orwell. In his will Orwell, who died in 1950, requested that no biography of him be written. Arguably, that should have been the end of it. But can a public figure forbid that a biography be written, particularly a writer as important as Orwell? I pass over the irony of Orwell, of all people, exercising a kind of posthumous thought control, the kind of tyranny he devoted his life to opposing. One of his literary executors assured us that it was not a very profoundly held wish. Mentioned very casually in the will, it reflected no more than a fear on Orwell's part that he might be written up extravagantly or luridly immediately after his death. His widow, the other literary executor, seems to have agreed it was a temporary proviso, for in the early 1950s she asked Malcolm Muggeridge to write the biography, which he began, but then abandoned.

But the wish does make one somewhat uneasy. Why did he express it? He was, or appears to be, an intensely autobiographical writer, and he felt, I believe, that he had used his own experience as he wished it to be used—to point to a particular moral. He was not interested in other people poking around his life and using the material in a different, perhaps contradictory way. There is, after all, more than one way of looking at the truth—not, I hasten to add, that there appear to be any skeletons knocking around in his closet. But one thing that makes Orwell fascinating as a writer is his use and transformation of his own experience. It is that relation between his art and his life that I find particularly challenging, not only as a life story, but for its insight into the artistic process. This very distancing—the psychology that made it necessary for him to write under a pseudonym—makes it more imperative that a biography of him exist than it might for most other writers.

In the case of Orwell we have also experienced another, not unfamiliar form of bias: he is a famous man whom many have their own ideas about, ideas which they do not like to have challenged. The legend—which has now perhaps been somewhat modified—is of a sort of Lawrentian figure, in cloth cap and riding a bike, who came from the lower classes of England and preached a form of honest egalitarianism. For some, especially those who pick and choose among his writings and don't wish to know anything of his life as it actually was, he was kind of plaster saint. In fact he was a good deal more complex than this, more admirable because more human, faults and all, more logical too in his development as a man.

I believe that we have depicted an Orwell truer to what he was than the figure of simple-minded legend, a man who was an artist determined to shape his own reality, and not merely a reporter of what he saw. Whether we have succeeded our readers must decide. Like all biographers, one can only hope to be read without bias.

Peter Stansky is professor of history at Stanford University.

The Last Nixon Watch
by John Osborne

". . . not only searching and informative, but sane and balanced as few others have been . . ."
Marquis W. Childs



May 2
$7.95

Cartoons by Paul Szep

Public Work Public Workers
by Ralph J. Flynn

". . . an eloquent statement of the rationale for granting parity to public workers in the area of collective bargaining."
W. J. Usery, Jr., Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service



May 9
$5.95

The New Republic Book Company, Inc.
1826 Jefferson Pl., NW, Wash., D.C. 20036

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Big Four

Meeting In Potsdam
by Charles L. Mee, Jr.
(Evans; $10.95)

Like generals who tend to prepare for the last war, statesmen generally seek to avoid the consequences of the last peace. So at Versailles the Big Four were determined not to let the defeated nation Germany have a say in the final settlement the way that France did at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. So, too, at Potsdam, haunted by the mistakes of Wilson, Truman had decided never to convene a full-scale peace conference. Another obsession held by the American delegation was to cling to the formula of unconditional surrender for Japan. In this way the Americans could ensure that Japanese militarism would be eradicated; there would be no armistice and no German army intact the way it had been in 1919. Finally the Americans were convinced that excessive reparations in the 1920s had contributed to the rise of nazism; this time around, postwar Germany would be allowed enough economic growth to ensure stability. There were to be no German reparations in specific dollar value in the Western zone, a change from what the Russians thought had been agreed to at Yalta. These three notions were to have profound consequences for the meeting held on the outskirts of the ruins of Berlin, July 17 to August 2, 1945, where Truman encountered Stalin and Churchill.

Charles L. Mee's account of the conference is absorbing reading but highly misleading because its selective use of scholarly sources seriously distorts the historical realities in order to buttress the author's thesis. Flanked by his new Secretary of State James F. Byrnes and his military adviser Adm. William D. Leahy, President Truman set sail on July 7 aboard the cruiser S.S. *Augusta* to confront the Europeans with a special brand of idealism and mistrust. Moreover, Truman had a secret that he was not about to share with his Russian ally—an atomic bomb was being tested on July 16, the day before the conference opened, at Alamogordo, New Mexico.

According to this version Stalin appears the best-briefed participant at Potsdam, sophisticated in his exchanges with Churchill and Truman. Churchill is surely the figure who most arouses compassion, tired, confused, rightly worried about the elections, which were to see him turned out of office before the conference ended and replaced by Attlee. Truman holds center stage, wooed by both sides. Determined not to be entrapped, Truman continually refers knotty questions to future ad hoc meetings of the foreign ministers, claiming that thereafter there will be a peace conference.

On the issue of reparations, the division of Germany, which no one had intended, came about. By excluding Russia from gaining significant reparations from the Ruhr, a deal was struck whereby, as Byrnes proposed, "each country looks to its zone for reparations and then exchanges reparations between zones." Mee rightly points out: "Thus Germany was divided and unified; it was divided on specific economic grounds, united on vague political grounds. In the future, the Big Three would operate on the realistic grounds of economic agreement and complain to one another on the grounds of their political agreement."

On these two issues Mee himself is on solid ground. Where he expounds the thesis that Truman dropped the atomic bomb primarily in order to frighten Russia he treads in quicksand. The evidence that this was Truman's intention is simply not there. For example Churchill's statement, made years later, that Japan's "defeat was certain before the first bomb fell" is linked by the author to his conclusion that the bomb was used "when, as Stalin knew, it was not militarily necessary." The two statements shouldn't be linked. Churchill was saying that Japan ultimately would have been defeated—which of course was true, but the cost in American military casualties could have been enormous. The military necessity was therefore there, whatever Stalin may have thought. In the citations listed, Mee shows he is acquainted with the literature but he has misread the information. To back up this conclusion he states that by July 25, "the bomb-as-a-weapon was generally believed to be unnecessary—as Truman had been told by Leahy and Eisenhower and [Adm.] King and [air force Gens.] Arnold and LeMay and others." Checking the sources, one finds that the real explanation is that the service chiefs held differing views of how to end the war, with no understanding of the effect the bomb might have on shortening the conflict. King's naval strategy was to blockade the Japanese into surrender; Arnold's air strategy was to continue to rain tons of bombs down on Japan. MacArthur was on record as favoring an assault by the armed forces on Kyushu in November, followed by an invasion through the Tokyo Plain in March 1946. Adm. Leahy simply did not think the bomb would work. On June 18 Truman and Gen. Marshall approved MacArthur's strategy. This was still the situation that prevailed at Potsdam. And when the bomb was successfully tested, Truman asked his chief advisers—Byrnes, Stimson, Leahy, Marshall, King, Arnold—whether the bomb should be used and, in Truman's words, "the consensus was that it should." But since the effect of the bomb, either in respect to the physical or psychological damage it would cause, was uncertain, plans also proceeded to go ahead with the invasion.

To accept Mee's skewed account is also to scant the major determining factor that made the Americans decide to use the terrible new weapon against the Tokyo government. Since the Japanese would not accept anything less than a conditional surrender, with the retention of the emperor, this ran square against the American doctrine of unconditional surrender, a commitment that the American public fully supported. Thus the reasons Gen. Marshall later gave for dropping the bomb cannot easily be dismissed. "One of the things that appalled me," Marshall said, "was the cost of casualties of an invasion . . . So we thought the bomb would be a wonderful weapon as a protection and as preparation for the landings. But we didn't realize its value to give the Japanese such a shock that they could surrender without loss of face."

No doubt possession of the bomb was also seen as a diplomatic weapon by the Americans. The conference date was adjusted by Truman in the light of the scheduled test of the bomb and reports of its success may well have contributed to making Truman even firmer in standing up to some of the Soviet demands. But dropping the bomb did not prevent the Soviets from entering the war against Japan, whether Truman or Churchill still wanted them or not. Finally there is little or no evidence to indicate that at the sessions at Potsdam and later that year at the Foreign Minister's Conference in London, possession of the atomic bomb was used effectively as a diplomatic weapon against the Russians.

Could it have worked out differently? Did the victors at Potsdam, as Mee

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

asserts, rescue "discord from the threatened outbreak of peace"? No doubt they did. But it is hard to believe that anything other than discord could have resulted when a shattered world was confronted by two such different systems and ideologies as were embodied by the United States and the Soviet Union. Had these two powers composed their differences, what would have occurred would have been a miracle, rather than a mere meeting, at Potsdam.

James Chace

James Chace is managing editor of *Foreign Affairs* and author of *A World Elsewhere: The New American Foreign Policy* (Scribner's).

One of a Few

Prison Diaries by Edward Kuznetsov

(Stein and Day; $8.95)

This is a remarkable book by a remarkable man. Edward Kuznetsov was born in 1939, of a Russian mother and Jewish father. Upon reaching his 16th birthday—the age at which every Soviet citizen is required to obtain an "internal passport"—he yielded to his mother's entreaties and registered as a Russian. In 1960 Kuznetsov enrolled as a philosophy student at Moscow University, having passed his entrance examinations with distinction. Like many of his peers he took to reading *samizdat* (at that time consisting almost exclusively of unauthorized *belles-lettres*) and attending various equally unauthorized public poetry readings in Moscow. These transgressions earned him arrest and seven years of imprisonment, partly in jail and partly in penal camps with "special [read: brutal] regime." The years behind bars and barbed wire turned a "victim of youthful daydreamings" (his words) in search "for his [own] identity and to some extent a prey to [his] own stormy passions and the schoolboy's understanding of ideology" into a firm opponent of the Soviet regime. Yet his anti-Soviet views did not lead to anti-regime activities. Rather they took the form of several weighty decisions: to have no truck with the Soviet system at all, to declare himself a Jew and to emigrate to Israel.

In 1970, after marrying Sylvia Zalmanson, Kuznetsov, by then a resident of the Latvian capital Riga, and frustrated in his legal attempts to leave the country, embarked—along with 10 other young people, two of them non-Jews—upon a drastic course of action. The group's plan was to split into two parties that would board a plane flying from Leningrad to Murmansk, take possession of it, and then have one of its members—an accomplished flier, Mark Dymshitz—pilot the plane to Sweden. Set for June 1970, the plot never came to fruition. The KGB, clearly informed about the group's intentions, arrested all of them before they set foot on the plane.

The rest is history: Perhaps banking on a sympathetic response from public opinion abroad, at that time outraged by the rash of hijacking incidents throughout the world, or perhaps in order to provide an object lesson for the restive Jewish community in the USSR, the Soviet authorities put the abortive conspirators on trial, speciously accusing them of treason and attempting to *steal* state property (which was patently not their intention), rather than of an attempt at illegal border crossing and *taking possession* of state property. The latter crimes carry, by Soviet standards, relatively light terms of imprisonment. Treason, however, may result in the death sentence—which indeed was given to Dymshitz and Kuznetzov. The others received varying terms of imprisonment, up to 15 years. Reaction of world public opinion, however, was one of shock and condemnation; whereupon the regime reversed itself and commuted the death sentences to 15 years of "strict" (Dymshitz) and "special" (Kuznetsov) imprisonment. Kuznetsov was sent to camp, where he remains to this day. His wife, curiously enough, was released last year and permitted to emigrate to Israel.

Prison Diaries was written in 1970 and 1971, and then smuggled out to the West—by what route we do not know—where it was published in Russian in 1973. The reader who turns to this excellent English translation by Howard Spier for new revelations about the Soviet *monde concentrationnaire* will probably be disappointed. Not that it is short on details; they are there, in all their ghastly aura. But after Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag* and books such as Anatoly Marchenko's *My Testimony* it seems unlikely that we can learn anything substantially new about this sordid chapter in contemporary history. What Kuznetsov offers us, more notably, are a fascinating insight into himself and superb portraits in depth of the society from which he sprung—the society both within and outside the barbed wire. It is impossible to read the numerous descriptions, philosophical discursions and brilliant factual observations of the *Diaries* without a feeling of intense admiration for their author. One wonders what inner forces shaped so supple a mind and a spirit at once disciplined and courageous.

Kuznetsov is clearly a man without illusions; his comments on the Soviet order are tinged with profound pessimism: "I think that the essential characteristics of the structure of the [Soviet] regime are to all intents and purposes immutable, and that the particular political culture of the Russian people may be classed as despotic." Or: "A handful of intellectual oppositionists—a phenomenon as characteristic of Russia as it is alien to her national traditions—cannot and will not change things." Or his incisive remarks about the symbiosis between the hatred of intellectuals and of Jews, so traditional among large strata of the Soviet population. He knows that he is living in "a country of appearances, of dummies in shop-windows, of swollen statistics and bogus declarations; a country of fiction and of pretence . . . The repeal of the death sentence on Dymshitz and myself," for instance, "was of course planned."

Yet his somber reflections neither crush him, nor dampen his curiosity, nor corrode his defiant sense of humor. With extraordinary zeal he amasses information, some of it of a statistical nature, on camp conditions, on say, the incidence of self-mutilation, homosexuality or collusion with camp authorities among the various nationalities represented by the inmates (the Lithuanians, all of them Catholics and intransigent

WRITERS WHY WAIT?
PUBLISH YOUR BOOK IN 90 DAYS
. . . and get expert editing, design, manufacture, publicity, promotion and advertising—all under one roof at low costs. Two **free books** and literature give details and success stories. Write or call Dept. 107
EXPOSITION PRESS, INC.
900 So. Oyster Bay Rd., Hicksville, N.Y. 11801
(516) 822-5700

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nationalists, come off the best). His appraisal of the new image of the KGB, both through individual vignettes and generalizations, is penetrating, and even at times filled with ironic compassion (cynics all—"merely officials in a temple their God has left deserted," and thus all the more human). He is grimly clear-eyed about certain characteristics of political dissidents past and present: "Those who fight for freedom would appear to be extremely intolerant, particularly towards those in their own circle . . . The struggle for freedom itself is, due to one of life's ironies, in itself bound up with intolerance—as are all struggles for a radically new order." Yet he is also equally ruthless in examining his own motives. "What would a bunch of psychiatrists, with all their boring standards of normality and abnormality, think of me?" he exclaims in a characteristic passage, having just confessed his frequent quest for solitude and his impatience for even well-meaning cellmates.

Miraculously his sense of humor never seems to leave him. Indeed therein may lie the answer to the riddle of his survival—not physical, of course, but psychological—or, if you will, spiritual. Caught conversing while at work with another inmate, he is admonished by a guard: "'Why aren't you working? I'll make a note of that!' 'But commander, you don't know how to write!'" comes Kuznetsov's reply. "This was quite true, but it made him go wild. 'Kuznetsov,' he shouted, 'get to work! I'll report you, you lousy intellectual!'"

In his introduction to the *Diaries*, Leonard Schapiro cautions against regarding "this story as merely one more example of Soviet anti-Semitism. It is much worse than that. It is a part of the fate of all Soviet citizens, whether Jewish or not, who are unwilling to conform and to suffer in silence the persecution and repression meted out to their fellows for their religious beliefs or for their action in defending human rights." It would be facile to add, after agreeing with Schapiro's remark, that the number of such people is considerable, but the human qualities displayed by the author of *Prison Diaries* are rare, either in the Soviet Union or anywhere else in the world. A despotic and bureaucratic system—*i.e.*, the Soviet system—tends to produce mirror images, even among its most dedicated foes—a lesson, I fear, that many of us are bound to learn if the present exodus from the USSR, however limited, goes on. Yet surely as long as there are at least a few people like Edward Kuznetsov, there is ground for hope. However limited.

Abraham Brumberg

Abraham Brumberg, for many years editor of *Problems of Communism*, is the author of *In Quest of Justice: Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union Today* (Praeger).

Wide View

Japan: The Fragile Superpower by Frank Gibney

(Norton; $10)

Americans since the days of Lafcadio Hearn have been trying to define and delineate the elusive character of the Japanese, and although I am by no means familiar with the vast bibliography on the subject, it seems to me that there remains a *Rashamon* quality to the effort: the Japanese tend to vary according to the eye of their beholder. This testifies, of course, to the complexity of their civilization, and so it is not at all surprising that a popular comprehensive study of Japan has yet to be produced—and may never be produced. I do not mean by these prefatory remarks to belittle Frank Gibney's book, however, for it is a witty, erudite, immensely readable volume, and certainly one of the best panoramic views of Japan to have been published within memory. Yet it resembles a Japanese meal in the sense that, with all its elegance, color and ingenuity, it left me hungry for more substance. But perhaps the mistake is mine in expecting meat and potatoes when, in fact, Japanese culture like Japanese cuisine is a menu of intricate arrangements and delicate flavors.

Gibney underlines the fundamental quality of Japan when he stresses, in surveying the different aspects of Japanese life, that its remarkable stability is unmatched by any other industrial nation. This stability is apparent, for example, in its political system, which functions on the basis of consensus and in which it is bad form for the majority to outvote the minority without concessions. It is also apparent in Japanese corporations, which inspire such loyalty in their employees that labor unions have made scant headway. It is apparent as well in Tokyo, a sprawling metropolis that first strikes foreign visitors as sheer urban chaos but which is, in reality, an orderly agglomeration of distinctive neighborhoods with which citizens can identify and in which, it is worth adding, the crime rate is astonishingly low. Here then is a country of more than 100 million people who move, work and in many ways think together, without coercion, and their achievement challenges the thesis that modern-day economic success, especially in a land poor in resources, can only be attained under authoritarian government.

At the core of this phenomenon is the fact that Japan is, in very real terms, a national family. Or as the Japanese sociologist Nakane Chie has observed, it is a "vertical society" in which almost everyone has his niche and rank. The key element in this pattern is *amae*, or dependence, which prompts the Japanese to rely on each other to an extraordinary degree. The president of a steel company and the lowliest stoker in the mill are linked by a kind of kinship tie, as are members of the same government bureau or graduates of the same university class. This feeling of reliance contributes to weaknesses, Gibney points out, since grossly inefficient subordinates are frequently tolerated and even promoted because their superiors are responsible for their protection and advancement. But this attitude of mutual responsibility also strengthens the unity and security of the Japanese, and their dependence on one another is prevented from becoming rigidly stratified by their mobility. Japan, as Gibney emphasizes, is a true meritocracy in which the railway motorman's son from Akita prefecture who excels in exams and enters Tokyo University can, despite his family background, rise to preeminence in business or public life. Thus the Horatio Alger myth is alive and well in Japan, and along with their reverence for status the Japanese respect success. In regard to this drive for success incidentally, Gibney recalls the explanation given him by a Japanese friend for the failure of Christianity in Japan. "Christ hanging on the Cross . . . looks too much like a loser," the friend said.

For all its success and stability though, Japan is, as Gibney notes in the title of his book, a "fragile superpower." Its

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fragility was dramatized during the oil embargo imposed by the Arabs in late 1973, when Japanese industry nearly ground to a halt because of its almost total need for imported petroleum. Its fragility is also reflected, I think, in the essential disappointment of the Japanese people with what their economic progress has wrought. Their country has become ravaged by land speculators and polluting factories while, as a nation, their voice is barely heard in the world. Some years ago, after entertaining a visiting Japanese prime minister, Gen. de Gaulle quipped: "J'attendais un homme d'état et j'ai trouvé un commis voyageur en transistor." The Japanese deserve a better commentary than that, but the label of "transistor salesman" clings.

Stanley Karnow

Fine Print

Young, Oppressed and Living

Doris Grumbach

One of my constant New York correspondents, the same one who made me aware of *Small is Beautiful*, has written to tell me that Thomas J. Cottle's **A Family Album: Portraits of Intimacy and Kinship** (Harper & Row; $7.95, $3.75 paper) is his best book. I can't confirm that judgment, having read (of his seven other books) only his excellent study of children in Roxbury, Massachusetts, *Black Children, White Dreams*, which appeared last year. But this new book is as moving, as "true" in a special sense of that word, as anything I have come upon recently.

Cottle is a talented interviewer, a careful and sensitive listener and a very good writer. These are brief life stories of frightened, anxious, troubled, angry, lonely and despairing people of all ages and conditions: a 12-year-old boy whose bitterly quarreling parents drink; a divorced man deprived of his children by a half-mad, vengeful wife who doesn't love the children; a black mother whose young son aspires to be a scientist while she despises the scientific community for its indifference to the lives of blacks; a highly intelligent black college student who wants to learn about the white world and its literature, acquire the proper credentials, like his Ph.D., and then "decide whether to become a revolutionary or some slovenly old scholar."

There are other fine, revealing narratives, most of them given us in the voice of the subject, prodded along by the sympathetic and unassuming questions and self-effacing disclaimers of the interlocutor Cottle. Most painful to read is the life history told by Cottle himself of Marlene Elaine Tucker, one of the eight children of a father who deserted the family and a totally mad mother who beat her children unmercifully and without reason. After nine years of schooling Marlene lives her years into her early 20s with one violent, uncaring man after another, had their children (one of them badly defective), and, drunk, almost mad herself and deeply despairing, beats her own children until they need hospitalization. Her final monologue, told to her psychotherapist, is a tragic document of the depth of a lost soul:

Well, there ain't no lawyers, and there ain't no law courts to go to. What happens is that you can't live with yourself anymore, and you can't fight back, neither. I saw my mother go after my father that day in the kitchen. She did all right against him, too, as long as he was holding me. But all he had to do was get his hands free, and he might as well have killed her. You don't fight with men. Any way you name, they're bigger and stronger. They got more power, and they got the whole damn country on their side, too. Maybe rich women got it easy, but all I know is that I'm supposed to be a good mother. He can go running around every night or bring his friends here to eat and sleep, but I'm supposed to stay here and take care of the children. That's the way it is. He forgets they're his children, too.

No lawyers, no one coming around to help. You keep on living even though you can see that the whole thing is leading nowhere. There's no hope in all this. I'll tell you the truth. I'd go to that mental hospital all the Battaglias want me to go to. They could take me right now without a fight. I wouldn't even pack my stuff. I'd do it if someone could prove to me that those children would be looked after. That's right. The woman who almost

AUTHORS WANTED BY NEW YORK PUBLISHER

Leading book publisher seeks manuscripts of all types: fiction, non-fiction, poetry, scholarly and juvenile works, etc. New authors welcomed. For complete information, send for booklet NR-1. It's free. Vantage Press, 516 West 34 St., New York, N.Y. 10001.

MOVING?

PLEASE NOTIFY US 6 WEEKS IN ADVANCE

Name (please print)

Address

City State Zip

MAIL TO:
THE NEW REPUBLIC
381 West Center Street
Marion, Ohio 43302



ATTACH LABEL HERE for address change or inquiry. If you are receiving duplicate copies of TNR please send both labels. If moving, list new address above. Note: your subscription will end with the month and year given on the top line of label. Example: Jul 77 means subscription will end in July 1977.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

killed them last week is worried they might not be looked after properly.

Cottle's way with prose is to create compelling fiction (I mean prose containing the intensity and absorbing force of a good novel) out of brutal facts. He echoes our liberal fantasies: on the understanding all poor children must have for each other—ghetto blacks for the Appalachian poor-white, on "the handsome college campuses with all sorts of people mingling—rich and poor, young and old, black, brown, red, yellow, white. . . ." His experience then dispels those fantasies with the harsh details of the lives he explores. He concludes that "the observation of a single life is also an inspection of the human condition and its place in some evolutionary scheme."

With Cottle the reader is permitted entrance into these single, deprived lives, their relations to their families, their unique ordeals. In summary he writes: "The act of living is the most difficult of ordeals, and the creative maintenance of human relationships the most difficult of endeavors." One leaves this harrowing book with a new respect for the psychotherapist's work and sympathy for the enormity of his enterprise under the full force of universal (it would seem) human suffering: "the same old pains of rejection, competition, envy and exclusion . . . the pains of people hurting one another and of feelings taking bitter tolls."

"Anyone who reads even one story comes away a little more human," wrote my correspondent about Cottle's book. Yes.

Speaking of humanness, Lois Wheeler Snow, wife of the late, eminent journalist Edgar Snow, whose 1938 *Red Star over China* was a seminal book on the People's Republic, has just published a book about her husband's dying and death in Geneva in 1972. **A Death With Dignity** (Random House; $6.95) is an unusual narrative, not in its subject matter (in the last two years I have seen perhaps 20 accounts of the manner of dying told by loving survivors) but because the government of China, particularly Mao and Chou En-lai, sent a team of doctors and nurses to Geneva to see the Snows through the last stages of Edgar's cancer.

The Chinese approach to terminal illness was in marked contrast to that of the doctors in Lausanne. The "cool, self-contained" nurses, the uncommunicative doctors, the lack of attention paid to the psychological needs of patients: these are all familiar stories to American readers. What will not be so familiar is the Chinese team's readiness to make a hospital—a humane one—out of the Snow's home, once they saw it was not possible to take Snow back to Peking, their original intention. They stayed with the Snows "in coordinated attendance twenty-four hours a day," they mingled helpfully with the family, caring for their health and mental states. Everything done to and for the patient was carefully explained to them. The family were not made to feel outsiders but part of the community of patient and caretakers: "the sharing brought us together with the man upstairs and made the inevitable easier to accept."

This experience of stress on human values during the trial of terminal disease and the prospect of death is not unique to the Snows. Mrs. Snow says that others have experienced the same understanding treatment in Peking. No efforts were made to prolong Edgar Snow's life at the cost of additional suffering; but the last hours were made pain-free and his right to have some sense of control over his final hours was maintained. It was all in all a gentle and loving set of arrangements for the quick and the dying.

Mrs. Snow sees everything in modern China through partisan-colored glasses. The reader will be conscious of this, at the same time as he notes for what good, personal reasons this is so.

Hovel

Emma Lazarus was wrong in that bronze quote
"I lift my lamp beside the golden door" through
which her huddled masses passed, and even she'd
have to grant that all those weary homeless poor
haven't made it safe into the middle class.

Jesus was correct: "You have the poor always
with you"—and might as well have added *hovels*
to his description of the *have's* and *have-not's*,
that bad habit of people to split themselves
in two and hate and then fight. "Always," he said,

since one primeval pauper was turned away
and lay stone on stone or tied dried skins to sticks
or drove stakes and daubed sticks with clay, or dried mud
bricks in the sun, and built his wife a hovel
of penniless stuff but, nevertheless, saw

the fever of beggary shining in her.
Men who live in hovels are not citizens.
They are abandoned to bad food and bad skin,
bad teeth, bad shortages, filth, rags, and roaches,
all the states of rage, failure, and classic shame.

I wouldn't know what to say or where to sit
if I were pushed into a hovel, and one
waited and searched my face. I'd feel alien
as if a camel had come up close enough
to bite, and I choke on its legendary breath.

Bink Noll

Bink Noll is the author most recently of *The Feast* (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich). He teaches at Beloit College, Wisconsin.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Kauffmann, *from page 22*

Why does he pass Schneider in a London park before he later accidentally meets her in Barcelona? And why does Antonioni italicize it by moving the camera in on her after Nicholson passes? These and other matters may be intended to create thematic ambiguity but only make the narrative muzzy.

Much about *The Passenger* is admirable. Maria Schneider is less sexy but more appealing than she was in *Last Tango*. (A beautiful moment: While driving with Nicholson in an open car, she asks him why he wants to escape the past. He tells her to turn her back to the front of the car, and she kneels on the back seat as the car speeds and looks at the road racing away behind her. A smile, very sweet, blooms on her face.) Jenny Runacre, the "widow," has just the man-eating quality that some homely sexy English women have. (Though a scene with her lover is superfluous.) The editing is silken.

The color photography by Luciano Tovoli is both good and dull. The desert is the best since *Lawrence of Arabia*. London streets, a baroque Munich church, various Spanish restaurants, all combine to make this a supertravelogue. But there seems to be no attitude on Antonioni's part toward the pictures. Even in *Zabriskie Point* much of the photography was implicative. Here it is merely perfect.

The final sequence has already been much discussed. Schneider leaves Nicholson on his bed. The camera moves up to look out the grilled window. An empty bullring across the way, from which a trumpet solo comes for a while. (Almost no music in the whole film.) An old man, seated against the bullring wall. Some passersby. An auto-school car circles in and out. Schneider appears outside, walking idly. A Citroen drives up, out of which get a black man who is of the government forces (against Robertson) and a white man who is a karate expert for them. The black man comes into the hotel. The white man sees Schneider, whom he apparently recognizes because they have been following her and Nicholson, and he goes over to shunt her away from the hotel by some means. We hear doors opening and closing behind the camera, which is still inside the room. Then the camera moves out between the bars on the window, and a police car arrives with Runacre and the police. We go back to the room. The police enter with Runacre and Schneider. Nicholson is dead. They ask the women to identify him. Runacre, apparently wishing not to disturb the disguise he wanted, denies that she knew him. Schneider, of the new life, says she did know him.

Antonioni has often worked toward long and taciturn last sequences, which summarize and exalt what the film has been about: the terrace at the end of *L'Avventura*, the tennis game in *Blow-Up*, the seven-minute montage at the end of *Eclipse*. In each of those cases the final sequence was an exquisite apotheosis of the film's deepest meanings. Not in *The Passenger*. The last sequence is just an original, highly sophisticated way to handle the end of a thriller.

Then there is the *last* last sequence. As night falls and the credits are printed at the side, the camera looks past the lighted lobby of the small hotel at the darkened little town, as music comes at last into the film. It's an extremely pretty picture, but Antonioni never made merely pretty pictures before. It means that life goes on? Life would still go on, even without that Technicolor plum at the finish.

Between my two viewings of *The Passenger* I saw Antonioni's very first feature film, *Story of a Love* (*Cronaca di un Amore*, 1950), never shown in the US and soon to be released here by New Yorker Films. Certain resemblances between the first and the latest films are striking. First, though the younger Antonioni's style is less secure, it is his—a camera that is usually only an observer but an observer of drama. If there is a typical Antonioni movement, it's beginning a sequence with a fixed camera that pans across a place until it finds a person in that place who is relevant, then follows him across that place until he meets a person who has been waiting, out of range of the opening composition. This gives an underlying sense of cosmos and predestination to his films. Many, many sequences in *The Passenger* begin with such horizontal pans, some of them with vertical ones; the best of the sequences in *Story* show where that idea came from. If this style lacks the participatory feeling of Bergman's or Kurosawa's traveling camera, which often accompanies a character, it compensates with a conviction of flow and fate.

Second, the material of the early film, like *The Passenger*, has to do with the past coming back to haunt the present. A man and a woman once "innocently" allowed another woman to die so that they could become lovers. They don't; and the surviving woman marries a rich man. The pair now plan to murder the rich husband and have their love, but again an "innocent" death intervenes.

Story begins with a quest, like *The Passenger*, and it, too, tries to use a plotty script for moral reverberations. Lucia Bosé, the rich woman, is weak, but Massimo Girotti (also later of *Last Tango* in which he was the dead wife's lover) is appealing as the man. *Story* is somewhat lightweight irony, but anyone would know (some did at the time) that it was the result of an individual view of life and cinema.

The Passenger, one may say without undue patness, is *Story of a Love* fully

THE NEW REPUBLIC

My Check for $_____ is enclosed.

☐ A Year of The New Republic, $17

☐ Two Years of The New Republic, $29

ADDITIONAL POSTAGE—Outside USA—$3

Name

Address

City State Zip Code

If Gift, card to read from _____

381 West Center Street, Marion, Ohio 43302 D1210

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

realized: a superior entertainment of enormous polish and control, despite some flabbiness as described—with all its moral matters and metaphysics quite accessible. It's on about the same level of accessibility as *Story*. But look at what came about between those two films: the trilogy of *L'Avventura*, *La Notte* and *Eclipse*, which are among the highest points of film history, and such beautiful works as *Le Amiche*, *Red Desert* and *Blow-Up*. In *The Passenger* there are only a few poignant reminders of those works: a rooftop scene between a man and woman as in *L'Avventura*, a close-up of a flaking wall as in *La Notte*, and, as noted, the last sequence. These resemblances and others are solely formal. Not one moment of *The Passenger* conveys personal conviction, *necessity* for it to be made. Not one moment tends toward the commitment of private mystery. It is all plot motion on which meaning has been painted. *Zabriskie Point* was a failed serious film. *The Passenger* is a pretty successful high-class entertainment.

Important artists finish, sometimes, before they quit work. Faulkner, for instance, wrote copiously but not very consequentially in the last 20 years of his life. It may be that Antonioni, who began fairly late—he was 38 in 1950—has finished fairly early, as far as his major work is concerned. Apparently the elements that fused in him to raise him above anything like ordinary consideration are no longer functioning for him; yet he wants to be active, and is certainly able to work with his skills alone. If this proves to be continuingly true of his future, it will be bitter for his admirers, like me, but it cannot possibly diminish our gratitude for what he has done.

The Classifieds

Personals

SAVE THE ECONOMY! Thousands of frustrated executives in steel/glass buildings with chrome/plastic desks, wall-to-wall carpeting and no wood to knock on for luck are postponing vital decisions. They need our Executive Knocking Block; genuine walnut, $3.50; 3/$10. Perfect for Father's Day. Oh, hurry! WRY IDEA Co., Rye, New York 10580

EMPATHETIC, FEMINIST-ORIENTED MAN, 27 seeks communication with similar woman. Rog North, 2717 Courtlandt, Kalamazoo, Michigan 49004

SINGLE MALE'S COMPANIONSHIP SOUGHT. Canoe quiet Northwest waters, share readings, feelings with gal 52. Academic, planning country home. P.O. Box 5551, Eugene, Oregon 97405

NEW FRIENDS THROUGH MAIL! Send letter describing yourself, type of person you will enjoy writing, $1 and SASE. Newfriends, Box 954, Chatsworth, California 91311

TELL YOUR TROUBLES TO MR. SYMPATHY for personal, confidential reply. No initial fee Box 205, Roselle Park, New Jersey 07204

HANDWRITING ANALYSIS IN DEPTH, $10.00 and sample to Elisabeth King, 41 E. 29th Street, New York 10016

MEDITATE for personal development; complete home study course, $3.00. Datrix, Box 424-A, Planetarium Station, New York 10024

THE SCHOOL DROP OUT RATE for American Indian children of the Southwest remains extraordinarily high. Help keep a Navajo or Pueblo child in school and make a personal friend for only $15 per month. Write for information to Futures for Children, 4401 Montgomery, N.E., Albuquerque, New Mexico 87109

Games

PLAY CHESS BY MAIL. Fun! Free Book! Checkmate, Drawer 10879, NR4, St. Louis, Missouri 63129

Peace Personals

CALDER AMNESTY POSTER, 4-color, frameable, $5.50. Safe Return, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10010

Bumperstickers

"WHO KILLED J.F.K.?" 50¢, 2/$6, Donnelly, Box 1131, Winters, California 95694

BUMPERSTICKERS, DECALS, BUTTONS. Lowcost, custom made advertising for your Business, Special Event, Organization or Political Campaign. Buy direct from manufacturer and SAVE! Please state intended use for appropriate samples. Write for FREE Brochure. Price List and Samples. REFLECTIVE ADVERTISING INC. Dept. NR. 8551 Page Boulevard, St. Louis, Missouri 63114. Phone (314) 423-5495.

END CORRUPTION, "Nader for President" bumperstickers, 2 for $1, Mang, Box 542, South Laguna, California 92677

Literature

SECRET FBI DOCUMENTS—Just released Cointelpro files detail FBI conspiracy against democratic rights. Selections from these files are being published in *The Militant*. Two-month trial sub/$1. *The Militant*, Dept. E, 14 Charles Lane, New York, New York 10014

YOU CAN REACH 40,000 READERS

for only 60¢ per word

Special Introductory Offer
3 insertions for the price of 2

The New Republic's classified section is an effective, economical way to make the unknown known to a large responsive audience. Special introductory offer 3 insertions for the price of 2—only 60¢ per word (with this coupon only).

Please run the enclosed advertisement _____ times in THE NEW REPUBLIC. Advance payment of $_____ is enclosed.

_____

_____

_____

_____

(See frequency rates next page)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SAN FRANCISCO REVIEW OF BOOKS. Monthly. 75¢, subscription $8.25. 2140 Vallejo, San Francisco, California 94123

READ THE GUARDIAN—Newsweekly gives MARXIST viewpoint on national and international news. Special 8-week trial sub., $1.00 GUARDIAN, Dept. N.R., 33 West 17th Street, New York, New York 10011 (Full year $12.50, student $7.50)

FREE BOOK. Prophet Elijah Coming Before Christ. Megiddo Mission, Dept. 72, 481 Thurston Road, Rochester, New York 14619

Literary Services

WRITERS — "UNSALABLE" MANUSCRIPT? Try AUTHOR AID ASSOCIATES, 340 East 52nd Street, New York City 10022

PUBLISH YOUR OWN BOOK. We print as few as 200 copies paperback, hard cover, pamphlets. Quality, economy, and cooperation. FREE Details. Graphic-copy, Box 285R, Floral Park, New York 11011

PUBLISH YOUR BOOK! Join our successful authors: publicity, advertising, promotion, beautiful books. All subject invited. Send for free manuscript report and detailed booklet. Carlton Press, Dept. RZO, 84 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10011

Books Wanted

WANTED: FRANK MERRIWELL NOVELS. Any condition. Philip Terzian, 3801 Connecticut Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20008. (202) 362-5943.

Schools

ARTHUR MORGAN SCHOOL, Burnsville, North Carolina 28714. Coed boarding grades 7-8-9. Family units, small classes. Academic, work, craft and outdoor programs. Central American field trip.

Foreign Studies

MEET RUSSIANS FACE-TO-FACE on 3-week nonpolitical non-profit exchange visits to the USSR. Open to qualified Americans, all ages, occupations. Departures June through December. Write-Wire-Phone Citizen Exchange Corps, Dept. NR, 101 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10017 (212) 889-7960

Camps

CAMP BLUE HERON, PORT LORING, ONTARIO. A natural science camp founded 1963. Co-ed, ages 9-14 with wilderness outpost camping for experienced youth aged 14-16. Informal, individualized programs with competent naturalists; includes canoe tripping in the Ontario wilderness. Sessions scheduled for June 27-July 10, July 11-31, and August 1-28. Campers may choose any one or combination of sessions. Limited to 30 in Main Camp and 10 in outposts. Transportation provided from and to Buffalo or Toronto without fee. Write Box 160, Fort Erie, Ontario, L2A, 5M9; or call (513) 275-6976 or (716) 633-6193.

Employment Opportunities

TEACHERS-ADMINISTRATORS — Current school, college openings list in U.S. $5.00; Foreign $5.00; EISN, Box 662, Newton, Massachusetts 02162

EXCITING OVERSEAS JOBS. Directory $1.00. Research Associates, Box 1750-N, Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501

Property-Sale/Rent

GOVERNMENT LANDS . . . FROM $7.50 Acre! Vacationing, Farming, Investment! Exclusive "Government Land Buyer's Guide" . . . plus "Land Opportunity Review" listing lands throughout U.S. Send $2.00. Surplus Lands, Box 6588-SN, Washington, DC 20009.

Vacations/Travel

LINEKAN BAY SAILING RESORT, Boothbay Harbor, Maine. Fleet of sailboats, two masted schooner, sailing instructions, heated salt water pool. Write for folder.

MALLORCA—completely furnished house for rent. Two bedrooms, two bathrooms, Beautiful view. Near sea, tennis, pool. $400 per month, $125 week. (516) 938-7690 evenings or weekends.

SOUTH AMERICA & GALAPAGOS ISLAND 1-4 month experiences, low-cost. Free brochure, please write: NEW WORLD EDUCATIONAL TRIPS, P.O. Box 2131, Salinas, California 93901

UNIQUE NEW OCEAN COTTAGE on unspoiled private island, very few people, no commercial activity. Summer $450 weekly, offseason $150. Paul Foster, 126 Beach Road, Wilmington, North Carolina 28401

BIKE EUROPE: Two week, escorted sojourn from castle to castle. Bus carries luggage. Bicycle Odysseys, 1023 Southwest Yamhill, Portland, Oregon 97205

VACATION ON A WORKING FARM. Participate in activities as desired. Couples or families only. D. C. Moore, P.O. Box 654, La Junta, Colorado 81050. (303) 384-5158

TEACHERS, WRITERS, READERS, RELAXERS. Secluded, convenient 19th century Inn renting. Reasonable rates. Kitchen privileges, Upper Catskills, (212) 760-7697 days; (212) 533-5639 evenings.

PROVINCETOWN, CAPE COD —accommodations right on waterfront. Week, month or season, rooms, suite at *Rosy*, an old inn with extraordinary restaurant, lively bar. 603 Commercial Street, Provincetown, Massachusetts 02657 or call (617) 487-0307.

Arts & Crafts

APPALACHIAN HANDCRAFTS, high QUALITY, reasonable prices Catalog—50¢. Also request SPRING SAMPLER FESTIVAL" information. CAVE HOUSE CO-OP, 279 East Main, Abingdon, Virginia 24210

"GETTING STARTED IN STAINED GLASS" 50¢ Whittemore, Box 2065PP, Hanover, Mass. 02339

JAPANESE WOODBLOCK PRINT REPRODUCTIONS. Masterpieces by Utamaro, Hokusai, Hiroshige, etc. Catalog fully illustrated with 486 subjects. $8.00. Write Adachi Institute, CPO Box 362, Tokyo, Japan or Fuji Ueda, 17841 Golfview Road. Homewood, Illinois 60430.

Gourmet/Cookery

WILD RICE FANCY $4.00 pound prepaid. 5 pound minimum shipment. Eugene Floura, Blackduck, Minnesota 56630

Sports Equipment

BACKPACKING, SKI TOURING, CAMPING EQUIPMENT. Touring kayak kits, foldboats, accessories. Books, guides. Personalized, rapid service by knowledgable, concerned people. Free catalog. MOOR & MOUNTAIN, Dept 44, 63 Park Street, Andover, Massachusetts 01810

Records/Tapes

SEND YOUR BLANK TAPE AND $5.00. I'll record utterly delectable personal choices from 30-year collection of jazz/bigband/vocals/combos. Nothing trite. Joel Rosenblum, Box 151, Butler, Pennsylvania 16001

Music

BURTON HARPSICHORDS AND VIRGINALS—Professional instruments in kit form. Buron Jacks (Patented). Free brochure from Burton Harpsichords, 917 "O" Street, Box 8022N, Lincoln, Nebraska 68501

EASY TO PLAY AND MAKE. Quality instruments and kits: Dulcimers ($20 up), Psalteries, Banjos, Thumb Pianos; books, records, HERE, Inc., #N, 410 Cedar Ave., Minneapolis, Minnesota 55404.

DULCIMERS, FRETLESS BANJOS of highest quality craftsmanship and materials. Sunhearth, Roaring Spring, Pennsylvania 16673

HARPSICHORDS, CLAVICHORDS by Sperrhake, Dependable, beautiful, moderately priced. Robert S. Taylor, 8710 Garfield Street, Bethesda, Maryland.

Classified Rates

Per word (single insertion) .....60¢
Per word 6 times in one contract year .....55¢
Per word 12 times in one contract year .....50¢
Per word 24 times in one contract year .....45¢
Per word 48 times in one contract year .....40¢

Payment in Advance of Insertion Required for Less Than 24 Insertions in One Year
24 & 48 Insertions Billed Monthly with One Month's Payment in Advance

Copy Deadline: 19 days prior to Saturday issue date.

THE NEW REPUBLIC
1244 Nineteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

APR 15 1975

What Time failed to make clear, as did Newsweek, is that the Family's fortune, although legally divided into perhaps 84 trusts and a number of philanthropies, is centrally controlled from

(more)

RITTER LIBRARY
BALDWIN-WALLACE
COLLEGE

We'll get back to that Family's fortune momentarily. First, about that parenthesis . . .

When journalists reach the bottom of a manuscript page, they type "(more)" to indicate that their story is still not complete.

Yet even after that final page is written, there's usually a good deal left unsaid.

That's where [MORE] comes in. [MORE] is a magazine that picks up where the rest of the media leave off. Each month it offers

- an insider's look at the nation's news organizations and how they work—and often don't work
- profiles of the men and women who wield the power to keep you informed—and often uninformed
- analyses of news coverage that informs our daily lives—and often fails to

Which brings us back to that Family's fortune. Author Nicholas von Hoffman, writing in a recent issue of [MORE], reported after the parenthesis: ". . . the Family's fortune, although legally divided into perhaps 84 trusts and a number of philanthropies, is centrally controlled from the 56th Floor of 30 Rockefeller Plaza. *Time* gives the address . . . simply as an office from which the brothers conduct their philanthropic activities . . . it would have been somewhat more germane . . . to say that 15 employees of Rockefeller Family and Associates working out of that same office hold down 118 directorships in 97 different companies."

Nicholas von Hoffman went on to compile a carefully documented indictment of how and why the newsmagazines failed to inform us on Nelson Rockefeller and the extent of his power. It typifies the tough-minded scrutiny readers have learned to expect of [MORE] each month.

They've also come to expect incisive, compelling stories by contributors like Michael Arlen, Taylor Branch, Alexander Cockburn, Charlotte Curtis, Nora Ephron, David Halberstam, Jane Howard, Brit Hume, Murray Kempton, J. Anthony Lukas, Karl Meyer, Richard Reeves, Richard Schickel, Peter Schrag, Studs Terkel, Calvin Trillin. And more.



When the politics of publishing or the business of broadcasting prevents stories from appearing, [MORE] has more than once stepped in:

- *Baltimore Sun* reporter Gordon Chaplin wrote a piece exposing how former Vice President Agnew was marketing his Maryland home—and reaping the benefits of over $100,000 of taxpayer-provided improvements. Agnew tried to stop the story. He kept it out of the *Sun*—but not out of [MORE].
- When *CBS*' Roger Mudd prepared a script criticizing the network's decision to drop "instant analysis" of Presidential broadcasts, management officials killed the story. And the only people who saw it were the people reading [MORE].

[MORE]'s contributors don't stop with the daily news media. Anyone responsible for informing you—book publishers, advertisers, public relations people—is closely and carefully watched by them. Some of the news you may have been missing includes:

- How IBM spindles the media
- The perils of publishing: authors and libel
- Oil advertising: countering the slick
- Anatomy of a snow job: David Rockefeller and his PR men
- Why you may never find Ms. magazine at your check-out counter

When a magazine is in business to keep on eye on the media, it deserves some pretty tough scrutiny in return. *Newsweek* said of [MORE]: *"What distinguishes [MORE] . . . is the top-flight quality of its contributors and the national range of its criticism."* And from Tom Wicker of *The New York Times: "[MORE] gives us the kind of criticism we need: tough, cogent, and, above all, knowledgeable."*

Find out why. Simply fill out and return the order form today. A year's worth of [MORE] is only $10.

NR2

[MORE] **P.O. Box 576**
Ansonia Station
New York, N.Y. 10023

I want to know [MORE]. Enter a subscription in my name for 12 issues at $10, right away. And if, at any time, I'm not satisfied with [MORE], I reserve the right to cancel and receive a full refund on any unmailed issues.

[ ] Payment enclosed. [ ] Bill me

Name _____

Address _____

City _____

State _____ Zip _____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED